Regards géopolitiques 10(3) (2024)
Do Thanh Hai & Do Thi Thu Hien
Dr. Do Thanh Hai, Deputy Director General and Senior Fellow, East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, haidt@dav.edu.vn
Ms. Do Thi Thu Hien, Research Fellow, East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, hiendothithu-vbd@dav.edu.vn
Abstract
After the United States (US)’ adoption of the concept “Indo-Pacific” into its officialdom, it has emerged as an important geopolitical framework that reshapes regional dynamics and great powers relations. Situated at the heart of this strategic landscape, Vietnam has been caught between a rock and a hard place. Its engagements with the Indo-Pacific have demonstrated a versatile and adaptive act, reflecting its commitment to strategic independence and economic integration in navigating the uncertainty caused by increased US-China rivalry. Drawing from its key policy documents and behavior, the article argues that these two elements dictated Vietnam’s nuanced responses to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific frameworks. Vietnam tried to mitigate the geopolitical risk of being drawn to one side through ASEAN while taking advantage of economic connectivity initiatives to advance its interests.
Keywords : Indo-Pacific ; Vietnam ; policy ; China ; rivalry ; ASEAN ; Japan ; United States.
Résumé
Après l’adoption par les États-Unis du concept d’« Indo-Pacifique », celui-ci est devenu un cadre géopolitique important qui remodèle la dynamique régionale et les relations entre les grandes puissances. Situé au cœur de ce paysage stratégique, le Viêt Nam a été pris entre le marteau et l’enclume. Ses engagements dans la région indo-pacifique ont fait preuve de polyvalence et d’adaptation, reflétant son engagement en faveur de l’indépendance stratégique et de l’intégration économique dans le contexte de l’incertitude causée par la rivalité accrue entre les États-Unis et la Chine. S’appuyant sur ses documents politiques clés et son comportement, l’article affirme que ces deux éléments ont dicté les réponses nuancées du Vietnam à l’émergence des cadres indo-pacifiques. Le Vietnam a tenté d’atténuer le risque géopolitique d’être attiré d’un côté par l’ASEAN tout en profitant des initiatives de connectivité économique pour promouvoir ses intérêts.
Mots-clés : Indo-Pacifique ; Vietnam ; politique ; Chine ; rivalité ; ANASE/ASEAN ; Japon ; États-Unis.
Introduction
The concept of Indo-Pacific was first introduced into officialdom in 2007 by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his speech to the Indian Parliament, stressing the confluence of the two seas. Despite the initial unwelcome start, it reemerged and became a meme across the world. In 2013, both Japan and Australia adopted the term formally. Japan articulated the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy and Australia replaced the earlier “Asia-Pacific” with the Indo-Pacific framing in its 2013 Defense White Paper. When the US adopted the terms, it became a dominating trend with its allies. South Korea, Germany, France, the UK, Canada, and India followed suit. This marked a fundamental rethinking of regional geopolitics, emphasizing interconnectivity and shared challenges across two vast oceans and the greater role of India in response to the rise of China.
The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework and geopolitical arena presents both opportunities and challenges for Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. While it may enhance Vietnam’s position by attracting greater external commitment to the region and helping to counterbalance China’s rise, it also places Vietnam and Southeast Asia at the center of geopolitical tensions. So far, Vietnam’s response to the increasing prominence of the Indo-Pacific concept and various strategies has been nuanced and complex. Although the term “Indo-Pacific” has been used in many speeches and joint statements, Hanoi has not officially adopted it in its key policy papers. Also, Vietnams engagement in the Indo-Pacific is not uniform across sectors. While economic cooperation is robust and evident, political and security involvement remains cautious. Such a divergence challenges the understanding of Vietnam’s strategy as a single cohesive approach.
Efforts to decipher Vietnam’s approach to the Indo-Pacific mostly resort to the hedging strategy, which is defined as a dubious combination of resistance and cooperation against threatening power, and at the same time, to reduce strategic risks and reap economic benefits. It equates to keeping open multiple strategic options at times of uncertainty. In this vein, China is often regarded as the key factor behind Vietnam’s reluctance to formally embrace the concept of Indo-Pacific while fear of China’s expansions in the South China Sea also serves as a stimulus for Vietnam’s cooperation with other powers under the theme (Trinh and Ho 2024; Tung 2022; Wu and Velasco 2024). While it is currently the dominant framework, hedging has its own weaknesses. First, as it involves a mix of engagement, balancing, and avoidance; its boundaries are often unclear. Second, hedging emphasizes strategic ambiguity, which may oversimplify Vietnam’s approach. While Vietnam avoids overt alignment, its policies often reflect deliberate and calculated choices to advance specific national interests.
This paper aims to analyze Vietnam’s perspective on the Indo-Pacific as a concept and as a range of different visions and strategies, as well as its strategic response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. To this end, it will explore Vietnam’s fundamental interests and review how the term has been used and how the rise of the Indo-Pacific has been perceived from this viewpoint. Also, the paper will examine how Vietnam responded to the Indo-Pacific from the sectoral standpoint.
Hanoi’s core interests: Strategic Independence and Economic Integration
The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter for Vietnam’s foreign policy. Losing the Soviet Union as its principal ally and economic partner left Hanoi strategically exposed and economically vulnerable. Being among a few socialist countries that survived, Vietnam was concerned about both safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity and preventing erosion in the power of the ruling communist party (Hai 2021, 166-169). Instead of shoring up its defense and further isolating itself from the potential dangers like the case of North Korea and Cuba, Vietnam moved to reset its relationship with its old foes, most notably China and the US, and aggressively proceeded to join regional and international organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in 1997 and later the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007.
Vietnam’s strategic thinking has been shaped by its long history of foreign invasions and struggles for independence. Having endured centuries of Chinese domination, French colonial rule, and intense conflict with the United States, the country developed a strong ethos of independence and self-reliance. These experiences instilled a deep-seated caution against foreign entanglements that might compromise sovereignty. At the same time, it had a valuable lesson learned that leaning on one side did not make it more secure. Hanoi’s military alliance with Moscow did not prompt the Soviet Union to act against China’s use of force on Vietnam-controlled islets in the Spratly in 1988. The US also abandoned its South Vietnamese ally in 1975. This laid an ideological ground for the introduction of the policy of strategic independence and self-reliance, which was codified in its first Defense White Paper in 1999 as the “Three-No Policy” which was no military alliance, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory and no aligning with one country against another (Zeberlein, 2024).
It is equally important to note that the “Three-No Policy” did not equate to political and strategic isolation. Vietnam is interested in expanding economic ties with the world to develop its economy, which was crippled by its centrally planned mechanism and economic embargoes imposed by the US-led Western bloc for a decade preceding the end of the Cold War. The severe socio-economic crisis in the mid-1980s prompted the communist elites in Hanoi not only to reconsider its economic model but also its foreign economic policy. Since 1986, Hanoi decided to start market-based reforms and open its economy to foreign trade and investment while ensuring that the country retained control over its political and social systems. The end of the Cold War provided a favorable ground for Vietnam to pursue a policy of independence, self-reliance, multilateralization, and diversification based on national interests, not ideological attachments.
Under these circumstances, the strategic independence posture allowed Vietnam to engage with multiple great powers economically while avoiding being entangled in their strategic conflicts (Thuy, 2016; Chapman, 2017). Instead of seeking an alliance with one great power to counterweigh another, Vietnam attempts to manage its relations with major powers “within a much larger regional network of interlocking economic and political interests”, of which “if any one country wanting to violate its sovereignty would be violating interests of other countries as well” (Abuza 1996, 411). Under the “friend to all” foreign policy, it moves beyond the ideological divide and joins the world and works to create amicable, and productive relations with all major powers and neighboring countries, reducing confrontations and prompting economic cooperation. It has also embarked on the policy of international integration, plugging its economy into the global market and actively involved in regional and international organizations not only to develop its own economy but also to create complex interdependence.
Vietnam’s caution against the term “Indo-Pacific”
President Trump’s choice of Vietnam as a venue to announce his Indo-Pacific vision implied the country’s important position in the new security landscape. Theoretically speaking, the US-led Indo-Pacific construct would benefit Vietnam and Southeast Asia in multiple ways. Firstly, it signaled the commitments of external powers such as the US, European Union powers, and India to the region, which enhanced its strategic and economic options. Secondly, the assertion and operationalization of a range of Indo-Pacific strategies would bring more resources to the region and help redress the imbalance of power tipped by China’s rapid increase in military and economic power. Third, the alignment of a range of powers into the Indo-Pacific continuum would place a constraint on China’s behavior in the South China Sea, where Hanoi has a host of sovereignty and maritime disputes with Beijing.
It is fair to assess that Vietnam’s interests mostly aligned with the principal values enshrined in the Indo-Pacific initiatives and strategies by the US and its allies, such as peaceful solutions to disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, freedom of navigation and overflight, free and open trade. The prevalent support for the rules-based order, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would serve as an opposition to China’s unlawful maritime claims and assertive actions and improve the security of critical maritime routes. At the Asia Future Conference in Tokyo in 2019, Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh praised the importance of a rules-based regional order in fostering fairness and mutual benefit. He emphasized that a sustainable and effective international order must uphold principles of fairness and equality, remain open and balanced among various ideologies, and ultimately serve the interests of all peoples and nations (Minh 2019).
However, Vietnam’s response to the Indo-Pacific was not straightforward, but quite nuanced. While not openly supporting any Indo-Pacific visions and strategies, Vietnam did not oppose them either. When asked about Vietnam’s position on the US’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific in August 2018, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)’s spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang did not mention the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) and said, “Vietnam welcomes initiatives and efforts to connect the region, which contributes to this goal (connecting the region)” (Tung 2022, 894). As Trinh and Ho opined, Vietnam took a cautious stance, not to show overt alignment with FOIP. However, the same position was reiterated on China’s Belt and Road Initiative. When asked about Vietnam’s participation in the 8th Belt and Road Summit in 2023, Vietnam MOFA’s spokesperson Pham Thu Hang asserted, “Vietnam welcomes initiatives to foster regional connectivity based on the principles of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, respect for each other, and compliance with international law and the UN Charter, contributing to development and prosperity of all nations” (Bao Chinh Phu, 2023).
Hanoi has not officially adopted the “Indo-Pacific” as a new geographical framework for its foreign policy, let alone making its own Indo-Pacific policy. Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific have remained the dominating policy framings in the CPV’s key documents in the 12th and 13th Party Congresses in 2016 and 2021 respectively, in which the Indo-Pacific was almost absent. In the most recent White Defense Paper published in 2019, Asia-Pacific was mentioned four times while the Indo-Pacific was referred to only once. Yet, in this document, the Indo-Pacific was used mainly as a place where security and defense mechanisms were situated, not a geopolitical ideal. In 2018, addressing the Council on World Affairs in New Delhi, Vietnam’s then-President Tran Dai Quang stated, “The ever-closer economic, political and culture ties between the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean will create a new driver for growth and help transform the Asian Century into the Indo-Asian-Pacific Century” (Thuong and Oanh 2021: 134). The reference to the term “Indo-Asian-Pacific Century”, clearly reflected reluctance in Hanoi to adopt the term “Indo-Pacific” as a whole.
Vietnam’s hesitancy to endorse the Indo-Pacific concept in its foreign policy is aligned with its desire for strategic independence. The term Indo-Pacific is often viewed as a new geopolitical construct, an overarching cover for a range of the US, its allies, and India to align their policies to compete with China (Hai, 2020; Binh & Quang, 2020). While facing a more powerful China in the disputes in the South China Sea, Vietnam has no interest in joining the US and other powers’ attempts to encircle China, compromising its strategic independence. Vietnam might consider that China’s challenge in the South China Sea has not mounted an imminent military threat that would prompt the country to change its strategic autonomy (Hai 2021). While recognizing the role of the US and other powers in regional stability, Hanoi does not want to send “wrong signals” to Beijing that it is picking sides (Tung 2022, 897-98). The above-mentioned reference to the “Indo-Asian-Pacific Century” meant a desire for an “inclusive approach”, which does not exclude any country.
However, it does not mean Hanoi is terrified by Beijing. This approach applies to all initiatives that hold geopolitical connotations. In the same vein, Hanoi has been also ambiguous about China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It did not lend support to any regional plans that forced the region to take sides. The legacy of past conflicts, particularly with China and the US, informs Vietnam’s cautious approach to engaging with its northern neighbor while simultaneously seeking economic benefits from initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Gezgin, 2020; Liu, 2024). This duality reflects Vietnam’s desire to maintain its sovereignty while benefiting from economic opportunities presented by any great powers. However, Vietnam remains vigilant about the potential security implications of such engagements, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach that prioritizes national interests (Raghupathy, 2024).
Although Hanoi has never formally and fully adopted the term “Indo-Pacific”, it did not deny that some canons of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific advocated by the US and its allies are in line with its interests. Therefore, Vietnamese leaders referred to the concept quite often and accepted its use in a range of joint statements with those of other countries, especially with regard to safeguarding peace, stability, rules-based order, and sustainable development in the region. For example, in October 2020, at the third Indo-Pacific Business Forum, former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh affirmed that Vietnam supports “an Indo-Pacific region of peace, development, and prosperity grounded in close cooperation, integration, and connectivity.” At the 6th Indian Ocean Conference held on May 2023, Deputy Foreign Minister Do Hung Viet mentioned “promoting close cooperation among countries in the Indo-Pacific region to build a sustainable development community” as one of three main messages toward a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable future for the region.” Instead of expressing support for specific Indo-Pacific initiatives or the approach, Vietnamese officials mostly stated their aspirations for the region. Though referring to the Indo-Pacific, these statements did not amount to a new policy framework.
Neutralizing the Indo-Pacific geopolitical impacts through ASEAN
One of Vietnam’s fundamental responses to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific was reflected in its negotiation and endorsement of the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019. While Indonesia played a leadership role in engineering the outlook, Vietnam also played an important part in shaping it. In this document outlook, the Indo-Pacific is viewed as both “a closely integrated and interconnected region” and a combination of “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” as separate geographical entities. The key tenet of AOIP is to emphasize the Indo-Pacific as “a region of dialogue and cooperation”, instead of rivalry (ASEAN 2019). Like other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam was anxious that increased US-China rivalry would destabilize the region and force it to take sides.
Despite the name, the AOIP did not mount to a new idea or new mechanism. The entire document is about ASEAN and the re-statement of its norms and principles, the ASEAN-led mechanisms, and proposed potential areas. Rather than creating new regional architecture, ASEAN proposed to use its derivative mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ADMM-Plus to advance the norms and carry out relevant projects and activities. In other words, the AOIP is practically an attempt to strengthen ASEAN’s self-claimed centrality in the increasingly competitive environment in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
While setting aside the possibility of alignment with any other specific visions or initiatives, AOIP proposed areas for cooperation with external powers, including maritime, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and other Areas of Cooperation. A case in point is that when ASEAN negotiated with India on how to link the AOIP with India’s Indian and Pacific Oceans Initiatives (IPOI), ASEAN insisted on the title ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook of the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the region signed on 18 October 2021. The reading of such a statement shows it is not about the recognition of India’s IPOI, but it is about India’s support for AOIP. The same is applied to the ASEAN-US Leader Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific of 7 September 2023.
In this vein, Vietnam’s interests converged with those of other Southeast Asian states. Vietnamese scholars voiced concerns about regional polarization through formation of the naturally exclusive groupings through the Belt and Road Initiative and a range of Indo-Pacific constructs (Tung and Mai 2019). Vietnam lobbied other powers to lend their support to the AOIP. For example, in joint statements on upgrading Vietnam’s bilateral relationship with Japan, the US, and Australia, Vietnam expressed appreciation for these countries for supporting the AOIP and for ASEAN centrality. It is argued that Vietnam’s active involvement in ASEAN initiatives allows it to project its influence while fostering a collective response to the challenges posed by great power competition in the region (Yoshimatsu, 2022). This multilateral approach is essential for Vietnam, as it seeks to balance its relations with both the United States and China, leveraging ASEAN’s centrality to mitigate the risks associated with great power rivalry (Manh, 2022). In this vein, the AOIP emphasizes the importance of maintaining regional stability and promoting a rules-based order, which aligns with Vietnam’s interests in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Mishra, 2021; Darwis, 2020).
Focusing on economic integration and connectivity
While being cautious about the strategic aspects of the Indo-Pacific construct, Hanoi was more receptive and open to economic cooperation under its cover. The most important case in point is Vietnam’s active participation in the negotiation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) launched by US President Joe Biden in May 2023. The initiative involves 14 founding members in the Indo-Pacific region, including 7 ASEAN members and excluding China. The framework is built upon four pillars, including supply chains, clean economy, tax and corruption, and fair trade, of all which Vietnam is involved. By June 2024, IPEF negotiation concluded four agreements on supply chain, clean economy, fair economy and the creation of an IPEF Council and Joint Commission. However, the participating countries have not managed to conclude an agreement on trade.
For some time, Vietnam complained the US’ first Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific in February 2018 was military and security-centric. Hanoi encouraged Washington to engage more deeply on the economic front. Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a disappointment to Hanoi. Consequentially, Vietnam was more receptive to the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022 of which the economic pillar was strengthened. According to Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Quang Vinh, the US’ new Indo-Pacific strategic document represented a “new opportunity to expand and diversify markets and supply chains, especially to take advantage of high-quality cooperation and production chain on digital economy, high-tech, and green transition” (Lan Huong, 2022).
Vietnam saw IPEF as a vehicle to strengthen its trade, investment, and connectivity with key partners across the region. As a result, Vietnam aligns itself with the framework’s overarching goals of fostering sustainable economic growth, ensuring resilient supply chains, and promoting innovation in areas like digital trade and renewable energy. Addressing a meeting of IPEF partner nations as part of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Week in the US in November 2023, Vietnam State President Vo Van Thuong emphasized on the need for new investments in building infrastructure, transitioning to clean energy and high-tech industrial production to effectively implement the IPEF (Vietnam News, 2023). It should be noted that Vietnam decided to join IPEF much to China’s displeasure. China has expressed concerns that the IPEF could lead to economic exclusion and fragmentation in the region. Chinese officials argue that the framework promotes a “decoupling” from China, which could disrupt regional trade and economic integration (Ng 2023).
It should be noted that Vietnam’s participation in IPEF is consistent with its long-standing policy of international integration. Since the end of the Cold War, the political elites in Hanoi increasingly believe that to avoid lagging economically behind, Vietnam needs to integrate into the world’s capitalist economic system. As a result, Vietnam moved to negotiate its admission to the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, World Trade Organization, and a range of free trade agreements with major economies. Unlike its vigilance in the strategic and military domain, Vietnam has no reservations about making it plugged into all major economies or economic blocs. Therefore, it stood among a few countries which was part of negotiations on the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership and China-led Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership. By April 2024, Vietnam had signed 16 free trade agreements and was negotiating two more. The Vietnamese officials believed that economic integration is not only an indispensable pathway to development but also helps foster peaceful and amicable relations among nations through interdependence.
Vietnam adopted the same approach to other partners’ Indo-Pacific strategies, giving emphasis on economic cooperation and connectivity. During the meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and Vietnam State President Vo Van Thuong in December 2023, Vietnam and Japan agreed to elevate its relationship to the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. In the exchange, it is stated, “In the economic field, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his desire to further strengthen cooperation with Viet Nam, an important supply chain hub and one of the most promising investment destinations, to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Partnership” and to promote initiatives that will lead to growth and vitality of the entire region. In response, President Thuong supported Prime Minister Kishida’s statement, and the two sides confirmed their further collaboration on major official development assistance (ODA) and investment projects” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023).
The European Union (EU) has also recognized the importance of the Indo-Pacific region and is actively seeking to establish a stronger presence there. The EU’s strategy emphasizes comprehensive partnerships with regional countries, including Vietnam, focusing on upholding a rules-based international order, fostering economic cooperation, and facilitating sustainable development (European External Action Service, 2021). EU is interested in cooperation in enhancing Vietnam’s maritime security and cybersecurity capabilities amid regional tensions (Guarascio and Vu, 2024). While the EU is interested in labeling Vietnam as an important partner of its Indo-Pacific strategy, Vietnam is keen on pushing for the EU’s approval of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement and EU’s support in implementing Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) (Ha Van, 2024). Addressing the 3rd Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum hosted by the European Union in February 2024, Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son reaffirmed Vietnam’s commitment to combat climate change and foster green transition and reiterated the importance of Vietnam as one of the first three countries to establish JETP after COP26.
Another case in point shows Hanoi’s special interest in fostering economic cooperation under the Indo-Pacific framework was its Quad Plus discussions in coping with the coronavirus pandemic and the supply chain in March 2020. Since its inception, Vietnam has kept a watchful stance over the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which was a group of the US, Japan, Australia, and India. It probably had two reservations. First, China viewed Quad as simply a strategic instrument by a group of extra-regional powers attempting to contain it. Second, the rise of Quad was also seen to have detrimental effects on ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture. Vietnam’s participation in such a Quad plus format, together with South Korea and New Zealand, showed Hanoi’s keen interest in forging new economic partnerships and properly responding to the widespread Covid-19 pandemic. This stood a stark contrast with Vietnam’s lackluster response to the invitation to join Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness. In the same vein, Vietnam was also hesitant to participate in the European Union’s initiative Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (Bich, 2023). Such different behavior showed how open Vietnam is regarding trade and economic cooperation and how cautious it is to the initiatives which are deemed security in nature.
Conclusion
The analysis of Vietnam’s responses and engagement with Indo-Pacific initiatives over time reveals a mixed pattern. Hanoi’s approach remains selective and tactful, varying based on specific contexts and sectors. Underlying its actions is a strategic choice rooted in Vietnam’s national interest in maintaining strategic autonomy, fostering a rules-based international order, safeguarding its sovereignty, and capitalizing on supply chain shifts to achieve more favorable positioning in the global economy. Vietnam’s response to the rise of Indo-Pacific illustrates its cautious approach to avoid entrapment in the Sino-US rivalry, opting instead for defending ASEAN centrality and its own strategic autonomy that allows it to engage with multiple powers without compromising its sovereignty. On the other hand, Vietnam is poised to confidently embrace Indo-Pacific economic cooperation, leveraging opportunities for greater economic cooperation and connectivity. To do so, Vietnam aimed to secure access to critical trade networks and investment opportunities, strengthening its resilience amid global supply chain shifts.
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