Étiquette : United States

The US « Indo-Pacific Strategy »: Concept, Action and Evaluation

Laisser un commentaire

Regards géopolitiques v11n1, 2025

Dr. Gong Ting

Dr. Gong Ting is Deputy Director & Associate Research Fellow at the Department for International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing.

Abstract: The deepening of United States focus on “Indo-Pacific region” in recent years symbolizes a major shift in US global strategy, which is entering a new cycle focused on « great power competition ». The Trump Administration 1.0 created the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » and promoted it from concept to action, and the Biden administration has further strengthened the strategy. The evolution of the strategy has several implications on the Asia-Pacific region, including intensifying the forming of blocs and regional instability, bringing anti-globalization factors to Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation, etc. The U.S. has also prioritized “American First” in its relation with its allies and partners in the region.

The Asia-Pacific region is culturally diverse, economically vibrant and has great potential for development. Pursuing peace, development and cooperation remains the common pursuit and aspiration of the people in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region need to learn from the experience of the past three decades, adhere to maintaining regional security, stability and prosperity, oppose the new Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, resist anti-globalization and decoupling, and jointly promote the construction of a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, open and inclusive Asia-Pacific community.

Key Words: United States, « Indo-Pacific Strategy », Asia-Pacific, Analysis

Résumé : L’accent mis par les États-Unis sur la « région indo-pacifique » ces dernières années incarne un changement majeur dans la stratégie mondiale des États-Unis, qui entre dans un nouveau cycle axé sur la « concurrence entre grandes puissances ». L’administration Trump 1.0 a créé la « stratégie indo-pacifique » et l’a fait passer du concept à l’action, et l’administration Biden l’a encore renforcée. L’évolution de la stratégie a plusieurs conséquences sur la région Asie-Pacifique, notamment l’intensification de la formation de blocs et de l’instabilité régionale, l’introduction de facteurs anti-mondialisation dans la coopération économique régionale en Asie-Pacifique, etc. Les États-Unis ont également donné la priorité à l’« American First » dans leurs relations avec leurs alliés et partenaires dans la région.

La région Asie-Pacifique est culturellement diverse, économiquement dynamique et possède un grand potentiel de développement. La recherche de la paix, du développement et de la coopération reste la quête et l’aspiration communes des peuples de la région Asie-Pacifique. Les pays de la région Asie-Pacifique doivent tirer les leçons de l’expérience des trois dernières décennies, adhérer au maintien de la sécurité, de la stabilité et de la prospérité régionales, s’opposer à la nouvelle mentalité de la guerre froide et à la confrontation des blocs, résister à l’antimondialisation et au découplage, et promouvoir conjointement la construction d’une communauté Asie-Pacifique plus pacifique, plus sûre, plus prospère, plus ouverte et plus inclusive.

Mots-clés : États-Unis ; Stratégie Indo-Pacifique ; Asie-Pacifique ; analyse.

In recent years, the United States has fabricated the concept of « Indo-Pacific » and vigorously promoted the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». It symbolizes another major shift in US global strategy, which is entering a new cycle focused on « great power competition ». The shift of the primary goal of US global strategy from « responding to terrorism » to « great power competition » has already sprouted since the Obama administration, marked by global strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region and proposals of the « Pivot to Asia » and « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific » strategies. During the first term, the Trump Administration created the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » and promoted the strategy from concept to action. The Biden administration has further strengthened this strategy, making it more dimensional and systematic.

  1. The US « Indo-Pacific Strategy« : From Concept to Action

1.1. Obama administration: Action preparation and conceptual planning for the « Indo-Pacific Strategy »

From « Back to Asia » to « Pivot to Asia », and then to « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific », US Asia-Pacific strategy that ran through eight years during the Obama administrations did not mention the word « Indo-Pacific ». However, the Obama administration pushed to shift of US global strategic focus from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region, which has had a sustained impact on the later versions of « Indo-Pacific strategies » of the Trump and Biden administrations.

In terms of strategic goals, the US aimed to build a regional strategic environment that aligned with its own interests. As put forward by Mr. Antony Blinken, the then Deputy Secretary of State of the Obama Administration, this effort is « to rebalance our focus on the region and to strengthen a rules-based, institutions-based order that is advancing our interests and increasingly not only in the region but globally »[①](US Department of State, 2016). As the weight of the Asia-Pacific region continued to rise in the world’s political and economic landscape, the US attached greater importance to the region, with the view to maintain its interests and « leadership » position. US goals included building an order that is in line with US political interests  and strengthening its alliance networks and partnerships, ensuring a « free and open » economic and trade system, strengthening US deterrence in security and promoting « US-style democracy and human rights ». At the same time, although the Obama administration still positioned China as a « partner », its perception of China as a « competitor » further intensified.

Therefore, the US focused on consolidating its regional alliance and partnership system, including deepening relations with its traditional treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia), strengthening trilateral relationships such as the US-Japan-South Korea, US-Japan-India, and US-Japan-Australia, and bringing closer partnerships with countries such as India, Indonesia. The US significantly expanded its military cooperation with regional allies and strengthened military deployment in the « First Island Chain » and « Second Island Chain ». To make up for shortcomings in its regional economic investment, the US also made efforts to « rule making » of regional economic architecture, through participating in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations since the year of 2009 and promoting its expansion. As a traditional foreign policy tool of US democrats, “Values-based diplomacy  » had also been given significant color.

While the « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific » strategy was facilitated, the word « Indo-Pacific » had been increasingly evident in US official discourses. In October 2010, the then US Secretary of State Clinton delivered a speech titled « America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific », emphasizing that « we understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade and commerce » (Clinton, H., 2010). Subsequently, Clinton and several senior US officials repeatedly raised the word of « Indo-Pacific » in several official occasions. However, during this period, the word « Indo-Pacific » emerged more as a geographical or geopolitical concept, and did not directly enter into US policy discourse.

 

1.2. Trump administration: formal proposal, basic formation and implementation of the « Indo-Pacific strategy »

After Trump took office as US president in January 2017, the Obama Administration’s “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific » strategy came to an end. In March 2017, the then Acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton said that the « the new administration has its own plan for the region, even if that plan has yet to take shape” (Defense News, 2017).

In October 2017, Trump officially proposed the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » during his attendance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Leaders’ Summit in Vietnam. With the US government significantly increasing its focus on the « Indo-Pacific region », its worldview has undergone a major adjustment since the end of the Cold War. In December 2017, the National Security Strategy Report (The White House, 2017) released by the Trump administration emphasized that the era of « great power competition » has arrived. The report defined the top three challenges facing US global strategy as « China and Russia »,  » North Korea and Iran  » and « transnational terrorist organizations ». Next, the Trump administration continued this tone in multiple official documents. The « Indo-Pacific strategy » was gradually introduced in this context.

Trump himself and his cabinet members extensively mentioned a « free and open Indo-Pacific ». In the eyes of the United States, the “Indo-Pacific region” contains 61% of the world’s population, and the US has 7 of its 15 largest trading partners located in this region. The US also has 5 treaty alliances in this region (US Department of Defense, nd). In the 2017 National Security Strategy Report, the US replaced « Asia-Pacific » with « Indo-Pacific » for the first time and officially proposed the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». Several US government departments then issued action documents centered on the « Indo-Pacific Strategy », outlining specific policies from the perspectives of defense, diplomacy and economy (US Department of Defense, 2019; US Department of State, nd).

In January 2021, the Trump administration declassified the 2018 version of the « US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific Strategy », which was drafted in 2018 and originally scheduled to be declassified on December 31, 2042. Such move reflected that the Trump administration launched top-level design around the « Indo-Pacific strategy » in the early stages after its inauguration, outlining US national security challenges, vital interests, top interests, specific actions and objectives, etc, in the context of “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. The Trump administration declassified this document before stepping down office, revealing a strong sense of building « Indo-Pacific Strategy » legacy.

In 2018, the US officially renamed the « Pacific Command » to the « Indo-Pacific Command » (the unified combatant command of the United States Armed Forces responsible for the “Indo-Pacific region”). The Trump administration gradually pushed the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » from concept to action. The Trump administration has generally followed the direction of strengthening US alliance and partnership system, but pays more emphasis on « America First ». However, in making the concept of « Indo-Pacific » more visible and increasing strategic attention to the region, the US and its regional allies have shown strong convergence.

In military perspective, the US aimed to establish a networked alliances and partnership that is “capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains” (US Department of Defense, 2019). While increasing the overall military spending, the US significantly increased joint exercises with its allies to enhance « readiness ». The Trump administration also continuously expanded security assistance to strengthen its influence on Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Pacific Island countries. The US military has also strengthened its military activities in the Western Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. According to the « South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative », from 2018 to 2020, the scale and intensity of US military activities in the South China Sea have significantly increased, including various strategic platform activities, sea and air reconnaissance, « Freedom of Navigation Operations », « transit through the Taiwan Strait », military exercises, etc (South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, nd).

Although Trump announced withdrawal from TPP at the beginning of his presidency, the US government has not completely stopped economic investment in the « Indo-Pacific region », and emphasized the need to make up for shortcomings in economic investment. In July 2018, the US announced a $113 million « down payment » to support the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure sectors in the region, with the aim of driving larger scale private investment. In October, the US introduced the « Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act »(BUILD Act). The act advocated for merging the existing Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to establish the United States International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC), attempting to innovate overseas investment and financing methods. During this period, the US established multiple partnerships with its allies and partner countries in areas such as energy, infrastructure, digital economy and cybersecurity.

 

1.3. Biden administration: Deepening and Upgrading the « Indo-Pacific strategy »

As the US political tradition says, « Politics stops at the water’s edge » (United States Senate, nd). Generally speaking, the continuity of the two parties in global strategy and diplomacy is greater than their variability. The Biden administration, which took office in January 2021, directly « followed » the name of « Indo-Pacific Strategy » created by the previous Republican administration without renaming it, and accelerated the deepening and upgrading of the strategy.

The Biden administration further highlighted the primacy of « responding to China » in US global strategy, particularly regarding the empowerment of its alliance and partnership system as a core means to « multiply power » and revitalizing global leadership. In the view of the Biden administration, the crucial position of the « Indo-Pacific region » and the « Indo-Pacific strategy » is even more prominent. The « Interim National Security Strategic Guidance « released in March 2021 emphasized that US « vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere » (The White House, 2021). The Biden administration also established a « Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs », which was the first time the White House National Security Council created a related position after « Indo-Pacific ».

In February 2022, the White House officially released the 19-page « Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States » (The White House, 2022), which identified five dimensions of « free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient » as the strategic objectives, and proposed action plans and timelines for the strategy. The US also released two « Fact Sheet(s) » for the strategy in February 2023 and February 2024, attempting to demonstrate a « fast pace » in advancing the strategy to reaffirm its « commitment » to the region.

In political and diplomatic context, compared to Trump 1.0, the Biden administration placed greater emphasis on conducting summit diplomacy and further « repairing » its alliance and partnership system. The US and relevant countries frequently expressed their views on « maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region » or promoting security, stability, and prosperity in the « Indo-Pacific region », emphasizing the need to deepen bilateral alliance treaties or partnerships. The US also sought to upgrade alliance or partnership with Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, attempting to achieve new breakthroughs in its relations with ASEAN and Pacific Island countries. The US also aimed to promoted stronger coordination among its allies and partners. Since the « reboot » during the Trump era, the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) has become a key increment for the US to deepen its « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». During the Biden administration, the QUAD dialogue has been upgraded to head-of-state level and held regularly, and added multiple areas of cooperation. The US also accelerated « NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific » and « NATO-ization of the Asia-Pacific region », frequently making statements with its NATO allies around the « Indo-Pacific region ». The allies of the US in the « Indo-Pacific region » showed an increasingly strong trend of

In security and military context, the US strengthened top-level design around « great power competition » and introduced the « Integrated Deterrence Strategy ». This reflected the Biden administration’s national defense strategy of starting from « position of strength » and “reinvigorated alliance power » in order to strengthen deterrence and competitive advantages. The US significantly raised its defense spending in the “Indo-Pacific Region”, especially increased its budget for the “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” year by year. The US promoted the establishment of AUKUS (The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.), with the goal of jointly supporting Australia in acquiring conventional nuclear powered submarines and sharing information, technology and intelligence among the three countries. Since 2024, AUKUS has continuously released expansion signals.

Compared to Trump 1.0, the Biden administration placed greater emphasis on strengthening the economic pillar of “Indo-Pacific strategy ». In May 2022, the US announced the launch of “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework”, an economic initiative put forward by former U.S. President Joe Biden, known as IPEF, which included 13 founding member countries (Fiji later joined as the 14th founding member), attempting to build a regional economic cooperation framework around four major areas: trade, supply chain resilience, clean energy transition and fair economy. The Biden administration outlined « economic security » and « supply chain cooperation », and built « supply chain alliances » with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and other countries around areas such as semiconductors and critical minerals. Meanwhile, sectors such as cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, clean energy, climate change and public health also became key concerns of the Biden administration.

Compared to Trump 1.0, the Biden administration’s « Value-based Diplomacy » actions in the “Indo-Pacific region” were more visible. The US government has significantly expanded its diplomatic resources in the region around issues such as democracy and human rights, anti-corruption, open society, independent media, civil society, etc.

  1. Evaluation of US “Indo-Pacific Strategy”

2.1. Intensifying the forming of blocs and regional instability

Building security and military alliances was a product of Cold War history and bloc confrontation. In the post Cold War era, the US still holds a Cold War and zero-sum mindset. Whether it is the « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific Strategy » or the « Indo-Pacific Strategy », the US has always prioritized strengthening its alliance system, enhancing the construction of the trilateral or quadrilateral blocs, and promoting a more networked regional alliance and partner system. Such moves had brought negative effects to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.

US military expenditure has been the highest in the world for decades, usually exceeding the total military expenditure of the following nine countries. In 2023, the US military expenditure was $916 billion, accounting for 37% of the total global military expenditure (SIPRI, 2024). As of 2022, there were around 750 US military bases in at least 80 countries and about 170,000 troops stationed outside of the US and its territories (Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2024).

The “Indo-Pacific Command” is the largest geographically covered of the six major combat commands of US military, with a force of over 370000 personnel, more than 1000 aircraft and over 100 warships (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, nd). During the Trump administration, according to incomplete statistics, the US conducted over 90 military exercises with its allies in the “Indo-Pacific region” each year (杨晓萍，2021). The Biden administration has further increased military spending in the “Indo-Pacific region”, with a significant increase in funding for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in the 2021-2024 fiscal years. The federal government’s budget proposal for the 2025 fiscal year has increased Pacific Deterrence Initiative budget request to $9.9 billion. The special funding for the “Indo-Pacific Command” under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 was as high as $15.3 billion, higher than for other theater commands.

With the continuity and long-term nature of US global strategic focus on the « Indo-Pacific Region », the US has been promoting significant strengthening of its Trans-Atlantic alliance system and the « Indo-Pacific » regional alliance system, especially accelerating the « NATO’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific » and « NATO-ization of the Asia-Pacific region », which has brought more unstable and uncertain factors to regional security situation. Since 2022, NATO summits have invited leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand three times, and listed the four countries as « global partners ». While conducting summits and high-level interactions, NATO’s military and security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, especially Japan and South Korea, has been upgraded from traditional defense cooperation such as personnel and ship visits to cooperation forms such as intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and joint research and development of weapons and equipment. Such actions not only increased the risk of bloc confrontation, but may also stimulate escalation of regional arms races and trigger more conflicts. As several scholars pointed out in an article published in Foreign Affairs in July 2024, « Rather than bolstering regional security, the alliance (NATO)’s growing engagement with Asia could fuel insecurity and instability (Droin, M., Grieco, K. & Jacob, H., 2024). The Jakarta Post, an Indonesian newspaper, published an editorial board review after Japan’s new Prime Minister Ishiba took office in 2024, stating that « ASEAN will not buy into Ishiba’s idea about an Asian NATO. As a group, ASEAN needs Japan as a reliable trading and economic partner, not a military ally that would only exacerbate tensions in the region » (The Jakarta Post, 2024).

In early 2023, AUKUS announced the road map and timetable for the US and UK to provide nuclear submarines to Australia. The three countries pieced together a “trilateral security partnership”, promoted cooperation in nuclear submarines and other cutting-edge military technologies, which stimulated arms race, challenged the international nuclear non-proliferation system, incited bloc politics and military confrontation, and undermined regional peace and stability. Former Sri Lankan President Wickremesinghe pointed out during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2023 that AUKUS was « a mistake » and that most countries in the region « will not want NATO anywhere close by » (South China Morning Post, 2023). Former Australian Prime Minister Keating criticized AUKUS as the « worst deal in all history » and « AUKUS is really about, in American terms, the military control of Australia » (The Guardian, 2023).

 

2.2. Empowering Regional Partners or “America First”?

The start of Trump 1.0 in 2017 was the result of deepening right-wing and conservative politics in the US. Therefore, Trump’s domestic and foreign policies were aimed at « America First » and adopted populist, nativist, unilateralism and protectionist approaches. The Trump administration not only ignored international mechanisms and global governance, withdrew from several international organizations and treaties, but also tends to use a « transactional » mindset to handle foreign affairs. The Trump administration was unwilling to invest in alliance relationships, which greatly weakened the credibility of US diplomacy.

The Trump administration also largely adhered to the principle of « America First » in dealing with its relationships with allies in the Asia Pacific region. It demanded that allies should share more obligations in security and imposed tariffs on allies. Such trends were reflected in US relations with Japan, South Korea, and other countries. The Trump administration has also frequently used economic and trade tools against US emerging partners, such as India and Vietnam. As the then president, Trump often made confrontational remarks against partner countries, withdrew from the TPP on his first day in office and repeatedly missed important multilateral occasions in the region, including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting and the East Asia Summit. As experts from the Brookings Institutions have pointed out, « the broader trend line for U.S. alliances and partnerships has been far more negative under the Trump administration” (Ford, L., 2020).

As a partner that the US is striving to bring closer, ASEAN has not responded positively to Trump administration’s « Indo-Pacific strategy ». Trump did not attach importance to ASEAN, not only missed the East Asia Summit for three consecutive years, but also missed the US-ASEAN Summit in its last year in office. Compared to attending the East Asia Summit five times during the Obama administration and making Southeast Asia a key partner for « Rebalancing » within the region, the Trump administration’s « Indo-Pacific Strategy » has significantly reduced its strategic emphasis on Southeast Asia. In the document of ASEAN Outlook on the « Indo-Pacific » (Center for International Law, 2019) released in 2019, ASEAN particularly emphasized the need to maintain « ASEAN-Centred Regional Architecture » and strengthen its discourse power. At the same time, the document also highlighted principles such as mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit, which were significantly different from the Trump administration’s version of the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ».

Different from the Trump administration, the Biden administration’s diplomacy emphasizes on boosting the alliance and partnership system and strengthening investment in allies and partners, with the “Indo-Pacific region” as a key focus. It can be said that Trump is the initiator of the slogan « America First », and both parties are promoters of America First policy. Compared to Trump’s unilateralism policy, the Democratic Party version of « America First » seems relatively « friendly » to U.S. allies and partners. However, this is not the case. Although the Biden administration emphasized on cooperation with allies and partners, it still adhered to protectionism and the policy of « buying American and hiring American », in order to cater for anti-globalization and economic nativism trends domestically. This resulted in limited benefits that US could provide for its allies in the so-called « friend-shoring ». a growing trade and industrial practice where supply chain networks are focused on countries regarded as political and economic allies (Ellerbeck, S., 2023). The US has also implemented many measures that harm the interests of its allies. For example, U.S. government required South Korean semiconductor enterprises such as Samsung to submit trade secrets. It imposed discriminatory measures against industries such as automobiles, batteries, and renewable energy from Japan, South Korea and Europe in subsidy policy from the Inflation Reduction Act.

 

2.3. Bringing anti-globalization factors to Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation

As Columbia University Professor Jeffry Frieden pointed out, « The United States is by far the most important locus of this backlash against globalization » (Frieden, J., 2018). As the biggest beneficiary and most active promoter of economic globalization, the US has played a more negative role in economic globalization and the global free trade system in recent years. Its unilateralism and protectionism trends have greatly increased, and mindsets for pan-securitization and « great power competition » continue to intensify. The fundamental reason lies in the fact that the US regards economic globalization as a « scapegoat » for the widening wealth gap and the failure of domestic wealth distribution mechanism domestically, and regards economic and trade issues as a « tool » for « great power competition ». The Trump administration prefers to impose tariffs, while the Biden administration is more inclined to resort to industrial and supply chain policies, both of which use export controls, investment restrictions, and economic sanctions more frequently. In all, the protectionist color of US trade and investment policies continues to intensify, with supply chain policies shifting towards localization, near-shoring and “friend-shoring”, industrial policies becoming more prevailing, and immigration policies becoming more conservative. This has led to a significant increase in international community’s concerns about « anti-globalization » and even « economic warfare ».

In the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific region has been the most dynamic and promising economic pillar in the world, and is widely recognized as an important engine of global economic growth. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have always adhered to open regionalism, continuously strengthened multilateral economic cooperation, and made important contributions to maintaining the multilateral trading system and promoting an open world economy. After withdrawing from the TPP, one of the high standard free trade agreements in the region, the US still talked about the need to make up for economic shortcomings of the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». It also launched the « Indo-Pacific Economic Framework » aimed at reshaping regional economic cooperation framework, but it did not substantially address key issues of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, market access, and other common concerns among regional countries. As pointed out by Mary Lovely of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, « the IPEF has not been crafted as a traditional trade agreement. In particular, it does not offer signatories preferential access to the U.S. market. That might make the IPEF more acceptable in the United States, but it will hamper the effectiveness of the pact” (Lovely, 2023).The reason behind is that with the rise of populism in the US, opposition against free trade has become largely “politically correct”. In such domestic political atmosphere, it is difficult for both Republican and Democratic governments to substantively continue promoting free trade agreement negotiations, let alone promoting open and inclusive regional cooperation and economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although seven ASEAN countries have joined the IPEF negotiations, their views on the effectiveness of IPEF are declining due to the lack of a substantial trade pillar and the increasing negative impact of domestic politics, especially election factors, on IPEF in the US. According to the State of Southeast Asia Survey Report 2024 conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, positive sentiments about the IPEF of Southeast Asian respondents declined from 46.5% in 2023 to 40.4% in 2024, while 44.8% of Southeast Asians respondents are increasingly unsure about the impact and effectiveness of the IPEF, rising from a 41.8% share from 2023. Negative sentiments have also increased from 11.7% in 2023 to 14.9% in 2024 (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024).

Conclusion. What kind of future vision does the Asia-Pacific region really need?

The “Indo-Pacific” concept twists the concept of Asia-Pacific that is the basic architecture of the region. Since the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region has become the center of world economic growth and a highland for global development, stability and cooperation. The key is that this region has surpassed the outdated thinking of zero-sum games and bloc confrontation, followed the trend of peace and development and is committed to maintaining regional security and stability, as well as deepening regional economic cooperation.

Faced with increasingly unstable, uncertain and unpredictable factors in world situation, the Asia-Pacific region is facing multiple new challenges. The Asia-Pacific region is culturally diverse, economically vibrant and has great potential for development. Pursuing peace, development and cooperation remains the common pursuit and aspiration of the people in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region need to learn from the experience of the past three decades, adhere to maintaining regional security, stability and prosperity, oppose the new Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, resist anti-globalization and decoupling, and jointly promote the construction of a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, open and inclusive Asia-Pacific community.

References

Center for International Law (2019). 2019 ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, June 23, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019-ASEANs-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific.pdf

Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2024). “ The US is sending more troops to the Middle East. Where in the world are US military deployed?”, April 5, https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/us-sending-more-troops-middle-east-where-world-are-us-military-deployed

Clinton, H. (2010). “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” October, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150141.htm.

Defense News (2017). “Pivot to the Pacific’ is over, senior U.S. diplomat says” , March 14, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/14/pivot-to-the-pacific-is-over-senior-u-s-diplomat-says/.

Droin, M., Grieco, K. & Jacob, H. (2024). “Why NATO Should Stay Out of Asia-The Alliance Would Leave the Region Less, Not More, Secure”, Foreign Affairs, July 8, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/why-nato-should-stay-out-asia

Ellerbeck, S.(2023). “What’s the difference between ‘friendshoring’ and other global trade buzzwords?”, World Econmic Forum, Feb., https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/02/friendshoring-global-trade-buzzwords/

Ford, L. (2020). “ The Trump administration and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, May, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fp_20200505_free_open_indo_pacific.pdf

Frieden, J. (2018). “The backlash against globalization and the future of the international economic order”, February, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jfrieden/files/frieden_future_feb2018.pdf

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (2024). “ The State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report”, March, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-State-of-SEA-2024.pdf

Lovely, M. (2023). “The Trouble With Trans-Pacific Trade”, Foreign Affairs, January 23, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trouble-trans-pacific-trade

SIPRI (2024). “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023”, April, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf

South China Morning Post (2023). “ On sidelines of UN General Assembly, Sri Lankan president calls Aukus ‘a mistake’ and rejects fears over China”, Sept. 19, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/sidelines-un-general-assembly-sri-093000067.html

South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (nd). http://www.scspi.org/zh.

The Guardian (2023). “ Paul Keating labels Aukus submarine pact ‘worst deal in all history’ in attack on Albanese government”, March 15, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/mar/15/paul-keating-labels-aukus-submarine-pact-worst-deal-in-all-history-in-attack-on-albanese-government.

The Guardian (2024). “ Aukus pact will turn Australia into ‘51st state’ of the US, Paul Keating says”, August 8, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/article/2024/aug/08/aukus-pact-will-turn-australia-into-51st-state-of-the-us-says-paul-keating

The Jakarta Post (2024). “No to Asia’s NATO”, October 5, https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2024/10/05/no-to-asias-nato.html

The White House (2017). “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, December, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

The White House (2021). “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”, March, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/#:~:text=This%20interim%20guidance%20has%20been,on%20a%20National%20Security%20Strategy.

The White House (2022). “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, February, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (nd). “ Headquarters, United States Indo-Pacific Command”, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/

United States Senate (nd). “Arthur Vandenberg: A Featured Biography”, https://www.senate.gov/senators/FeaturedBios/Featured_Bio_Vandenberg.htm

US Department of Defense (2019), “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region”, May 31, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1863396/dod-releases-indo-pacific-strategy-report/.

US Department of Defense (nd). “DoD Focus on the Indo-Pacific”, https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/focus-on-indo-pacific/#:~:text=The%20Defense%20Department%20is%20committed,international%20rules%2C%20laws%20and%20norms .

US Department of State (2016), “Obama Administration Policy in the Asia-Pacific”，April 28, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256694.htm

US Department of State (2019). A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, November 14, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

杨晓萍 [Yang Xiaoping]（2021）：《特朗普时期美国印太战略回顾》，载《军事文摘 [A Review of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Under Trump, » in Military Digest], juillet.

Vietnam and the Indo-Pacific

Laisser un commentaire

Regards géopolitiques 10(3) (2024)

Do Thanh Hai & Do Thi Thu Hien

Dr. Do Thanh Hai, Deputy Director General and Senior Fellow, East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, haidt@dav.edu.vn

Ms. Do Thi Thu Hien, Research Fellow, East Sea Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, hiendothithu-vbd@dav.edu.vn

Abstract
After the United States (US)’ adoption of the concept “Indo-Pacific” into its officialdom, it has emerged as an important geopolitical framework that reshapes regional dynamics and great powers relations. Situated at the heart of this strategic landscape, Vietnam has been caught between a rock and a hard place. Its engagements with the Indo-Pacific have demonstrated a versatile and adaptive act, reflecting its commitment to strategic independence and economic integration in navigating the uncertainty caused by increased US-China rivalry. Drawing from its key policy documents and behavior, the article argues that these two elements dictated Vietnam’s nuanced responses to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific frameworks. Vietnam tried to mitigate the geopolitical risk of being drawn to one side through ASEAN while taking advantage of economic connectivity initiatives to advance its interests. 

Keywords : Indo-Pacific ; Vietnam ; policy ; China ; rivalry  ; ASEAN ; Japan ; United States.

Résumé
Après l’adoption par les États-Unis du concept d’« Indo-Pacifique », celui-ci est devenu un cadre géopolitique important qui remodèle la dynamique régionale et les relations entre les grandes puissances. Situé au cœur de ce paysage stratégique, le Viêt Nam a été pris entre le marteau et l’enclume. Ses engagements dans la région indo-pacifique ont fait preuve de polyvalence et d’adaptation, reflétant son engagement en faveur de l’indépendance stratégique et de l’intégration économique dans le contexte de l’incertitude causée par la rivalité accrue entre les États-Unis et la Chine. S’appuyant sur ses documents politiques clés et son comportement, l’article affirme que ces deux éléments ont dicté les réponses nuancées du Vietnam à l’émergence des cadres indo-pacifiques. Le Vietnam a tenté d’atténuer le risque géopolitique d’être attiré d’un côté par l’ASEAN tout en profitant des initiatives de connectivité économique pour promouvoir ses intérêts. 

Mots-clés : Indo-Pacifique ; Vietnam ; politique ; Chine ; rivalité ; ANASE/ASEAN ; Japon ; États-Unis.

Introduction

The concept of Indo-Pacific was first introduced into officialdom in 2007 by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his speech to the Indian Parliament, stressing the confluence of the two seas. Despite the initial unwelcome start, it reemerged and became a meme across the world. In 2013, both Japan and Australia adopted the term formally. Japan articulated the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy and Australia replaced the earlier “Asia-Pacific” with the Indo-Pacific framing in its 2013 Defense White Paper. When the US adopted the terms, it became a dominating trend with its allies. South Korea, Germany, France, the UK, Canada, and India followed suit. This marked a fundamental rethinking of regional geopolitics, emphasizing interconnectivity and shared challenges across two vast oceans and the greater role of India in response to the rise of China.

The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework and geopolitical arena presents both opportunities and challenges for Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. While it may enhance Vietnam’s position by attracting greater external commitment to the region and helping to counterbalance China’s rise, it also places Vietnam and Southeast Asia at the center of geopolitical tensions. So far, Vietnam’s response to the increasing prominence of the Indo-Pacific concept and various strategies has been nuanced and complex. Although the term “Indo-Pacific” has been used in many speeches and joint statements, Hanoi has not officially adopted it in its key policy papers. Also, Vietnams engagement in the Indo-Pacific is not uniform across sectors. While economic cooperation is robust and evident, political and security involvement remains cautious. Such a divergence challenges the understanding of Vietnam’s strategy as a single cohesive approach.

Efforts to decipher Vietnam’s approach to the Indo-Pacific mostly resort to the hedging strategy, which is defined as a dubious combination of resistance and cooperation against threatening power, and at the same time, to reduce strategic risks and reap economic benefits. It equates to keeping open multiple strategic options at times of uncertainty. In this vein, China is often regarded as the key factor behind Vietnam’s reluctance to formally embrace the concept of Indo-Pacific while fear of China’s expansions in the South China Sea also serves as a stimulus for Vietnam’s cooperation with other powers under the theme (Trinh and Ho 2024; Tung 2022; Wu and Velasco 2024). While it is currently the dominant framework, hedging has its own weaknesses. First, as it involves a mix of engagement, balancing, and avoidance; its boundaries are often unclear. Second, hedging emphasizes strategic ambiguity, which may oversimplify Vietnam’s approach. While Vietnam avoids overt alignment, its policies often reflect deliberate and calculated choices to advance specific national interests.

This paper aims to analyze Vietnam’s perspective on the Indo-Pacific as a concept and as a range of different visions and strategies, as well as its strategic response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. To this end, it will explore Vietnam’s fundamental interests and review how the term has been used and how the rise of the Indo-Pacific has been perceived from this viewpoint. Also, the paper will examine how Vietnam responded to the Indo-Pacific from the sectoral standpoint.

Hanoi’s core interests: Strategic Independence and Economic Integration

The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter for Vietnam’s foreign policy. Losing the Soviet Union as its principal ally and economic partner left Hanoi strategically exposed and economically vulnerable. Being among a few socialist countries that survived, Vietnam was concerned about both safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity and preventing erosion in the power of the ruling communist party (Hai 2021, 166-169). Instead of shoring up its defense and further isolating itself from the potential dangers like the case of North Korea and Cuba, Vietnam moved to reset its relationship with its old foes, most notably China and the US, and aggressively proceeded to join regional and international organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in 1997 and later the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007.

Vietnam’s strategic thinking has been shaped by its long history of foreign invasions and struggles for independence. Having endured centuries of Chinese domination, French colonial rule, and intense conflict with the United States, the country developed a strong ethos of independence and self-reliance. These experiences instilled a deep-seated caution against foreign entanglements that might compromise sovereignty. At the same time, it had a valuable lesson learned that leaning on one side did not make it more secure. Hanoi’s military alliance with Moscow did not prompt the Soviet Union to act against China’s use of force on Vietnam-controlled islets in the Spratly in 1988. The US also abandoned its South Vietnamese ally in 1975. This laid an ideological ground for the introduction of the policy of strategic independence and self-reliance, which was codified in its first Defense White Paper in 1999 as the “Three-No Policy” which was no military alliance, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory and no aligning with one country against another (Zeberlein, 2024).

It is equally important to note that the “Three-No Policy” did not equate to political and strategic isolation. Vietnam is interested in expanding economic ties with the world to develop its economy, which was crippled by its centrally planned mechanism and economic embargoes imposed by the US-led Western bloc for a decade preceding the end of the Cold War. The severe socio-economic crisis in the mid-1980s prompted the communist elites in Hanoi not only to reconsider its economic model but also its foreign economic policy. Since 1986, Hanoi decided to start market-based reforms and open its economy to foreign trade and investment while ensuring that the country retained control over its political and social systems. The end of the Cold War provided a favorable ground for Vietnam to pursue a policy of independence, self-reliance, multilateralization, and diversification based on national interests, not ideological attachments.

Under these circumstances, the strategic independence posture allowed Vietnam to engage with multiple great powers economically while avoiding being entangled in their strategic conflicts (Thuy, 2016; Chapman, 2017). Instead of seeking an alliance with one great power to counterweigh another, Vietnam attempts to manage its relations with major powers “within a much larger regional network of interlocking economic and political interests”, of which “if any one country wanting to violate its sovereignty would be violating interests of other countries as well” (Abuza 1996, 411). Under the “friend to all” foreign policy, it moves beyond the ideological divide and joins the world and works to create amicable, and productive relations with all major powers and neighboring countries, reducing confrontations and prompting economic cooperation. It has also embarked on the policy of international integration, plugging its economy into the global market and actively involved in regional and international organizations not only to develop its own economy but also to create complex interdependence.

Vietnam’s caution against the term “Indo-Pacific”

President Trump’s choice of Vietnam as a venue to announce his Indo-Pacific vision implied the country’s important position in the new security landscape. Theoretically speaking, the US-led Indo-Pacific construct would benefit Vietnam and Southeast Asia in multiple ways. Firstly, it signaled the commitments of external powers such as the US, European Union powers, and India to the region, which enhanced its strategic and economic options. Secondly, the assertion and operationalization of a range of Indo-Pacific strategies would bring more resources to the region and help redress the imbalance of power tipped by China’s rapid increase in military and economic power. Third, the alignment of a range of powers into the Indo-Pacific continuum would place a constraint on China’s behavior in the South China Sea, where Hanoi has a host of sovereignty and maritime disputes with Beijing.

It is fair to assess that Vietnam’s interests mostly aligned with the principal values enshrined in the Indo-Pacific initiatives and strategies by the US and its allies, such as peaceful solutions to disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, freedom of navigation and overflight, free and open trade. The prevalent support for the rules-based order, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would serve as an opposition to China’s unlawful maritime claims and assertive actions and improve the security of critical maritime routes. At the Asia Future Conference in Tokyo in 2019, Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh praised the importance of a rules-based regional order in fostering fairness and mutual benefit. He emphasized that a sustainable and effective international order must uphold principles of fairness and equality, remain open and balanced among various ideologies, and ultimately serve the interests of all peoples and nations (Minh 2019).

However, Vietnam’s response to the Indo-Pacific was not straightforward, but quite nuanced. While not openly supporting any Indo-Pacific visions and strategies, Vietnam did not oppose them either. When asked about Vietnam’s position on the US’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific in August 2018, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)’s spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang did not mention the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) and said, “Vietnam welcomes initiatives and efforts to connect the region, which contributes to this goal (connecting the region)” (Tung 2022, 894). As Trinh and Ho opined, Vietnam took a cautious stance, not to show overt alignment with FOIP. However, the same position was reiterated on China’s Belt and Road Initiative. When asked about Vietnam’s participation in the 8th Belt and Road Summit in 2023, Vietnam MOFA’s spokesperson Pham Thu Hang asserted, “Vietnam welcomes initiatives to foster regional connectivity based on the principles of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, respect for each other, and compliance with international law and the UN Charter, contributing to development and prosperity of all nations” (Bao Chinh Phu, 2023).

Hanoi has not officially adopted the “Indo-Pacific” as a new geographical framework for its foreign policy, let alone making its own Indo-Pacific policy. Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific have remained the dominating policy framings in the CPV’s key documents in the 12th and 13th Party Congresses in 2016 and 2021 respectively, in which the Indo-Pacific was almost absent. In the most recent White Defense Paper published in 2019, Asia-Pacific was mentioned four times while the Indo-Pacific was referred to only once. Yet, in this document, the Indo-Pacific was used mainly as a place where security and defense mechanisms were situated, not a geopolitical ideal. In 2018, addressing the Council on World Affairs in New Delhi, Vietnam’s then-President Tran Dai Quang stated, “The ever-closer economic, political and culture ties between the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean will create a new driver for growth and help transform the Asian Century into the Indo-Asian-Pacific Century” (Thuong and Oanh 2021: 134). The reference to the term “Indo-Asian-Pacific Century”, clearly reflected reluctance in Hanoi to adopt the term “Indo-Pacific” as a whole.

Vietnam’s hesitancy to endorse the Indo-Pacific concept in its foreign policy is aligned with its desire for strategic independence. The term Indo-Pacific is often viewed as a new geopolitical construct, an overarching cover for a range of the US, its allies, and India to align their policies to compete with China (Hai, 2020; Binh & Quang, 2020). While facing a more powerful China in the disputes in the South China Sea, Vietnam has no interest in joining the US and other powers’ attempts to encircle China, compromising its strategic independence. Vietnam might consider that China’s challenge in the South China Sea has not mounted an imminent military threat that would prompt the country to change its strategic autonomy (Hai 2021). While recognizing the role of the US and other powers in regional stability, Hanoi does not want to send “wrong signals” to Beijing that it is picking sides (Tung 2022, 897-98). The above-mentioned reference to the “Indo-Asian-Pacific Century” meant a desire for an “inclusive approach”, which does not exclude any country.

However, it does not mean Hanoi is terrified by Beijing. This approach applies to all initiatives that hold geopolitical connotations. In the same vein, Hanoi has been also ambiguous about China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It did not lend support to any regional plans that forced the region to take sides. The legacy of past conflicts, particularly with China and the US, informs Vietnam’s cautious approach to engaging with its northern neighbor while simultaneously seeking economic benefits from initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Gezgin, 2020; Liu, 2024). This duality reflects Vietnam’s desire to maintain its sovereignty while benefiting from economic opportunities presented by any great powers. However, Vietnam remains vigilant about the potential security implications of such engagements, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach that prioritizes national interests (Raghupathy, 2024).

 Although Hanoi has never formally and fully adopted the term “Indo-Pacific”, it did not deny that some canons of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific advocated by the US and its allies are in line with its interests. Therefore, Vietnamese leaders referred to the concept quite often and accepted its use in a range of joint statements with those of other countries, especially with regard to safeguarding peace, stability, rules-based order, and sustainable development in the region. For example, in October 2020, at the third Indo-Pacific Business Forum, former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh affirmed that Vietnam supports “an Indo-Pacific region of peace, development, and prosperity grounded in close cooperation, integration, and connectivity.” At the 6th Indian Ocean Conference held on May 2023, Deputy Foreign Minister Do Hung Viet mentioned “promoting close cooperation among countries in the Indo-Pacific region to build a sustainable development community” as one of three main messages toward a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable future for the region.” Instead of expressing support for specific Indo-Pacific initiatives or the approach, Vietnamese officials mostly stated their aspirations for the region. Though referring to the Indo-Pacific, these statements did not amount to a new policy framework.

Neutralizing the Indo-Pacific geopolitical impacts through ASEAN

One of Vietnam’s fundamental responses to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific was reflected in its negotiation and endorsement of the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019. While Indonesia played a leadership role in engineering the outlook, Vietnam also played an important part in shaping it. In this document outlook, the Indo-Pacific is viewed as both “a closely integrated and interconnected region” and a combination of “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” as separate geographical entities. The key tenet of AOIP is to emphasize the Indo-Pacific as “a region of dialogue and cooperation”, instead of rivalry (ASEAN 2019). Like other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam was anxious that increased US-China rivalry would destabilize the region and force it to take sides.

Despite the name, the AOIP did not mount to a new idea or new mechanism. The entire document is about ASEAN and the re-statement of its norms and principles, the ASEAN-led mechanisms, and proposed potential areas. Rather than creating new regional architecture, ASEAN proposed to use its derivative mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ADMM-Plus to advance the norms and carry out relevant projects and activities. In other words, the AOIP is practically an attempt to strengthen ASEAN’s self-claimed centrality in the increasingly competitive environment in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

While setting aside the possibility of alignment with any other specific visions or initiatives, AOIP proposed areas for cooperation with external powers, including maritime, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and other Areas of Cooperation. A case in point is that when ASEAN negotiated with India on how to link the AOIP with India’s Indian and Pacific Oceans Initiatives (IPOI), ASEAN insisted on the title ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook of the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the region signed on 18 October 2021. The reading of such a statement shows it is not about the recognition of India’s IPOI, but it is about India’s support for AOIP. The same is applied to the ASEAN-US Leader Statement on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific of 7 September 2023.

In this vein, Vietnam’s interests converged with those of other Southeast Asian states. Vietnamese scholars voiced concerns about regional polarization through formation of the naturally exclusive groupings through the Belt and Road Initiative and a range of Indo-Pacific constructs (Tung and Mai 2019). Vietnam lobbied other powers to lend their support to the AOIP. For example, in joint statements on upgrading Vietnam’s bilateral relationship with Japan, the US, and Australia, Vietnam expressed appreciation for these countries for supporting the AOIP and for ASEAN centrality. It is argued that Vietnam’s active involvement in ASEAN initiatives allows it to project its influence while fostering a collective response to the challenges posed by great power competition in the region (Yoshimatsu, 2022). This multilateral approach is essential for Vietnam, as it seeks to balance its relations with both the United States and China, leveraging ASEAN’s centrality to mitigate the risks associated with great power rivalry (Manh, 2022). In this vein, the AOIP emphasizes the importance of maintaining regional stability and promoting a rules-based order, which aligns with Vietnam’s interests in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Mishra, 2021; Darwis, 2020).

Focusing on economic integration and connectivity

While being cautious about the strategic aspects of the Indo-Pacific construct, Hanoi was more receptive and open to economic cooperation under its cover. The most important case in point is Vietnam’s active participation in the negotiation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) launched by US President Joe Biden in May 2023. The initiative involves 14 founding members in the Indo-Pacific region, including 7 ASEAN members and excluding China. The framework is built upon four pillars, including supply chains, clean economy, tax and corruption, and fair trade, of all which Vietnam is involved. By June 2024, IPEF negotiation concluded four agreements on supply chain, clean economy, fair economy and the creation of an IPEF Council and Joint Commission. However, the participating countries have not managed to conclude an agreement on trade.

For some time, Vietnam complained the US’ first Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific in February 2018 was military and security-centric. Hanoi encouraged Washington to engage more deeply on the economic front. Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a disappointment to Hanoi. Consequentially, Vietnam was more receptive to the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022 of which the economic pillar was strengthened. According to Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Quang Vinh, the US’ new Indo-Pacific strategic document represented a “new opportunity to expand and diversify markets and supply chains, especially to take advantage of high-quality cooperation and production chain on digital economy, high-tech, and green transition” (Lan Huong, 2022).

Vietnam saw IPEF as a vehicle to strengthen its trade, investment, and connectivity with key partners across the region. As a result, Vietnam aligns itself with the framework’s overarching goals of fostering sustainable economic growth, ensuring resilient supply chains, and promoting innovation in areas like digital trade and renewable energy. Addressing a meeting of IPEF partner nations as part of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Week in the US in November 2023, Vietnam State President Vo Van Thuong emphasized on the need for new investments in building infrastructure, transitioning to clean energy and high-tech industrial production to effectively implement the IPEF (Vietnam News, 2023). It should be noted that Vietnam decided to join IPEF much to China’s displeasure. China has expressed concerns that the IPEF could lead to economic exclusion and fragmentation in the region. Chinese officials argue that the framework promotes a “decoupling” from China, which could disrupt regional trade and economic integration (Ng 2023). 

It should be noted that Vietnam’s participation in IPEF is consistent with its long-standing policy of international integration. Since the end of the Cold War, the political elites in Hanoi increasingly believe that to avoid lagging economically behind, Vietnam needs to integrate into the world’s capitalist economic system. As a result, Vietnam moved to negotiate its admission to the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, World Trade Organization, and a range of free trade agreements with major economies. Unlike its vigilance in the strategic and military domain, Vietnam has no reservations about making it plugged into all major economies or economic blocs. Therefore, it stood among a few countries which was part of negotiations on the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership and China-led Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership. By April 2024, Vietnam had signed 16 free trade agreements and was negotiating two more. The Vietnamese officials believed that economic integration is not only an indispensable pathway to development but also helps foster peaceful and amicable relations among nations through interdependence.

Vietnam adopted the same approach to other partners’ Indo-Pacific strategies, giving emphasis on economic cooperation and connectivity. During the meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and Vietnam State President Vo Van Thuong in December 2023, Vietnam and Japan agreed to elevate its relationship to the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. In the exchange, it is stated, “In the economic field, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his desire to further strengthen cooperation with Viet Nam, an important supply chain hub and one of the most promising investment destinations, to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Partnership” and to promote initiatives that will lead to growth and vitality of the entire region. In response, President Thuong supported Prime Minister Kishida’s statement, and the two sides confirmed their further collaboration on major official development assistance (ODA)  and investment projects” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023).

The European Union (EU) has also recognized the importance of the Indo-Pacific region and is actively seeking to establish a stronger presence there. The EU’s strategy emphasizes comprehensive partnerships with regional countries, including Vietnam, focusing on upholding a rules-based international order, fostering economic cooperation, and facilitating sustainable development (European External Action Service, 2021). EU is interested in cooperation in enhancing Vietnam’s maritime security and cybersecurity capabilities amid regional tensions (Guarascio and Vu, 2024). While the EU is interested in labeling Vietnam as an important partner of its Indo-Pacific strategy, Vietnam is keen on pushing for the EU’s approval of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement and EU’s support in implementing Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) (Ha Van, 2024). Addressing the 3rd Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum hosted by the European Union in February 2024, Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son reaffirmed Vietnam’s commitment to combat climate change and foster green transition and reiterated the importance of Vietnam as one of the first three countries to establish JETP after COP26.

Another case in point shows Hanoi’s special interest in fostering economic cooperation under the Indo-Pacific framework was its Quad Plus discussions in coping with the coronavirus pandemic and the supply chain in March 2020. Since its inception, Vietnam has kept a watchful stance over the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which was a group of the US, Japan, Australia, and India. It probably had two reservations. First, China viewed Quad as simply a strategic instrument by a group of extra-regional powers attempting to contain it. Second, the rise of Quad was also seen to have detrimental effects on ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture. Vietnam’s participation in such a Quad plus format, together with South Korea and New Zealand, showed Hanoi’s keen interest in forging new economic partnerships and properly responding to the widespread Covid-19 pandemic. This stood a stark contrast with Vietnam’s lackluster response to the invitation to join Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness. In the same vein, Vietnam was also hesitant to participate in the European Union’s initiative Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (Bich, 2023). Such different behavior showed how open Vietnam is regarding trade and economic cooperation and how cautious it is to the initiatives which are deemed security in nature.

Conclusion

The analysis of Vietnam’s responses and engagement with Indo-Pacific initiatives over time reveals a mixed pattern. Hanoi’s approach remains selective and tactful, varying based on specific contexts and sectors. Underlying its actions is a strategic choice rooted in Vietnam’s national interest in maintaining strategic autonomy, fostering a rules-based international order, safeguarding its sovereignty, and capitalizing on supply chain shifts to achieve more favorable positioning in the global economy. Vietnam’s response to the rise of Indo-Pacific illustrates its cautious approach to avoid entrapment in the Sino-US rivalry, opting instead for defending ASEAN centrality and its own strategic autonomy that allows it to engage with multiple powers without compromising its sovereignty. On the other hand, Vietnam is poised to confidently embrace Indo-Pacific economic cooperation, leveraging opportunities for greater economic cooperation and connectivity. To do so, Vietnam aimed to secure access to critical trade networks and investment opportunities, strengthening its resilience amid global supply chain shifts.

References

Abuza, Z. (1996). “International Relations Theory and Vietnam”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 17, 406-419.

ASEAN (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

Bao Chinh Phu (2023). Viet Nam hoan nghenh sang kien thuc day ket noi va hop tac khu vục [Vietnam welcomes initiatives to foster regional connectivity and cooperation], 14 September. https://baochinhphu.vn/viet-nam-hoan-nghenh-sang-kien-thuc-day-ket-noi-va-hop-tac-khu-vuc-102230914173033562.htm

Bich, T. (2023). Vietnam’s Quest for Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness”, ISEAS Perspective 96, 8 déc., https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2023-96-vietnams-quest-for-enhanced-maritime-domain-awareness-by-bich-tran/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Binh, P. T. T and Quang, V. N. (2020). Chiến lược Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương tự do và rộng mở” của Mỹ: Vai trò và cách thức triển khai [The US’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Roles and Means to Implement]. Tap Chi Cong San [Communist Review], 4 april, https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/the-gioi-van-de-su-kien/-/2018/816028/%E2%80%9Cchien-luoc-an-do-duong—thai-binh-duong-tu-do-va-rong-mo%E2%80%9D-cua-my–vai-tro-va-cach-thuc-trien-khai.aspx

Chapman, N. (2017). Mechanisms of Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36(2), 31-69.

Darwis, D. (2020). Asean and the contemporary geopolitics of the indo-pacific region: agenda for future research. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 3(4).

European External Action Service (2021). EU Indo-Pacific Strategy. 6 nov., https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-indo-pacific-strategy-topic_en

Gezgin, U. (2020). Reception of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam: Between Security Concerns and Infrastructural Financing Needs. Asya Araştırmaları Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 4(1), 115-124.

Guarascio, F. and Vu, K. (2024). EU’s Borrell offers Vietnam security support on South China Sea, Reuters, 30 juillet, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/eu-wants-upgrade-ties-with-vietnam-foreign-policy-chief-borrell-says-2024-07-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Ha Van (2024). “Chủ tịch Hội đồng châu Âu: Việt Nam là đối tác quan trọng trong Chiến lược Ấn Độ Dương-Thái Bình Dương” [European Council President: Vietnam is an important partner within the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy], Bao Chinh phu [The Government of Vietnam Portal], 10 oct., https://baochinhphu.vn/chu-tich-hoi-dong-chau-au-viet-nam-la-doi-tac-quan-trong-trong-chien-luoc-an-do-duong-thai-binh-duong-10224101021333915.htm

Hai, D. T. (2020). The Story of the Ocean, The Gioi & Viet Nam, No. 4, 5, 6.

Hai, D. T. (2021). Balance of Risks: Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategy. East Asian Policy 13(3), 37-56.

Hai, D. T. (2021). Vietnam and China: ideological bedfellows, strange dreamers. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 10(2), 162–182.

Thuong, N. L. T. & Oanh, N. T. (2021). Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific Region: Perception, Position and Perspectives. India quarterly, 77 (2), 129–142.

Lan Huong (2022). Việt Nam và ASEAN trong chiến lược Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương của Mỹ [Vietnam and ASEAN in the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy], Tuoi Tre, https://tuoitre.vn/viet-nam-va-asean-trong-chien-luoc-an-do-duong-thai-binh-duong-cua-my-20220218083303189.htm

Liu, Q. (2024). Comparison of Hedging Strategies between Vietnam and the Philippines amid the U.S.-China strategic competition. IJSSPA, 2(2), 31-42.

Manh, L. (2022). Vietnam’s perception and response to the emerging Indo-Pacific regional security architecture. Ilomata International Journal of Social Science, 3(1), 356-368.

Minh, P. B. (2019). Phát biểu tại Hội nghị Tương lại Châu Á [The speech of Vice Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh at the Conference on the Future of Asia], Bao Chinh Phu [The Government of Vietnam Portal], 31 mai, https://www.vietnamplus.vn/phat-bieu-cua-ptt-phambinh-minh-tai-hoi-nghi-tuong-lai-chau-a-post572189.vnp.  

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2023), Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting, 11/2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/vn/pageite_000001_00002.html

Mishra, R. (2021). Vietnam’s regional security perceptions and priorities: Role of India. India Quarterly 77(2), 200-218.

Ng, T. (2022). China says Washington’s ‘divisive’ Indo-Pacific strategy doomed to fail. South China Morning Post, 23 mai. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3178764/china-says-washingtons-divisive-indo-pacific-strategy-doomed

Raghupathy, S. (2024). Vietnam-China and the Indo-Pacific. Electronic Journal of Social & Strategic Studies 4(3), 356-372.

Thuy D. T. (2017). Firm in Principles, flexible in Strategy and Tactics” Understanding the logic of Vietnam’s China policy. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 2(1), 24-39.

Vietnam News (2023). Vietnam highlights three points to make Indo-Pacific Economic Framework an effective initiative. https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/1636736/viet-nam-highlights-three-points-to-make-indo-pacific-economic-framework-an-effective-initiative.html

Yoshimatsu, H. (2022). ASEAN and great power Rivalry in Regionalism: from East Asia to the Indo-Pacific. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 42(1), 25-44. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034221139297.

Zeberlein, J. (2024). Vietnam and the Four Nos: How Chinese Actions in the South China Sea influence Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy. Naval War College Review, 77(1), 115-135.