Regards géopolitiques 11(4), 2025

Anastasia Ufimtseva, Alexandre Veilleux and Kana Minju Bak

Dr. Anastasia Ufimtseva is a Senior Program Manager of the International Trade and Investment research pillar at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, an Adjunct Professor at the Beedie School of Business, and a faculty fellow at the Jack Austin Centre for Asia Pacific Business Studies. She holds a PhD in Global Governance from the Balsillie School of International Affairs at Wilfrid Laurier University with a specialization in international political economy.

Dr. Alexandre Veilleux is a Senior Program Manager at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada for Quebec, and Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. He specializes in issues of international political economy and Southeast Asian politics.

Kana Minju Bak is an International Trade and Investment Researcher at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. She holds an MSc in International Business and Sustainability from Sciences Po Paris (Institut d’études politiques de Paris) and an HBA in Contemporary Asian Studies and Diaspora and Transnational Studies from the University of Toronto.

Abstract
Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) identified South Korea as an anchor market for trade diversification in December 2021, nearly a year before Canada’s national IPS. Current scholarship remains limited on how sub-national actors, such as provinces, shape and influence spheres of public opinion and flows of international trade and investment. We aim to address this gap by examining how Quebec’s public opinion of South Korea, along with bilateral trade and investment relations, have evolved since the launch of its IPS. Leveraging original data from the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada – Investment Monitor database and National Opinion Poll – in addition to Statistics Canada, we find that inward foreign direct investment and trade have grown steadily since the launch of Quebec’s IPS in December 2021, with critical minerals and EVs especially benefitting from growing economic relations bolstered by increasing trust among Quebecers about South Korea.

Keywords: trade, investment, federalism, public opinion, Quebec, South Korea, Indo-Pacific Strategy

Résumé
La Stratégie indo-pacifique du Québec (SIP) a identifié la Corée du Sud comme un marché d’ancrage pour la diversification commerciale en décembre 2021, près d’un an avant la SIP nationale du Canada. Les recherches actuelles restent limitées sur la manière dont les acteurs infranationaux, tels que les provinces, façonnent et influencent l’opinion publique ainsi que les flux commerciaux et investissements internationaux. Nous adressons ce manque en examinant comment l’opinion publique québécoise à l’égard de la Corée du Sud, ainsi que les relations bilatérales en matière de commerce et d’investissement, ont évolué depuis le lancement de l’IPS. En nous appuyant sur des données originales provenant de la base de données Investment Monitor et du sondage d’opinion national de la Fondation Asie Pacifique du Canada, ainsi que de Statistique Canada, nous constatons que les investissements directs étrangers et le commerce ont augmenté de façon constante depuis le lancement de la Stratégie d’investissement du Québec en décembre 2021, les minéraux critiques et les véhicules électriques bénéficiant particulièrement de l’intensification des relations économiques, favorisée par la confiance croissante des Québécois envers la Corée du Sud.    

Mots-clés : commerce, investissement, fédéralisme, opinion publique, Québec, Corée du Sud, Stratégie Indo-Pacifique

1. A Decade of Growth: the Quebec-South Korea Economic Partnership

Since 1965, Quebec has consistently demonstrated its sovereignty in para-diplomacy and economic structuring since the inception of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. Case in point, Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) was launched in December 2021, nearly a year prior to the federal IPS in November 2022. The Indo-Pacific region was identified as a priority under the theme, “Pathway to Economic Growth,” with South Korea positioned as an anchor market for trade diversification and as one of the world’s leading international investors essential to achieving Quebec’s ambitions. By doing so, Quebec became the first subnational government in the world to formally articulate an Indo-Pacific Strategy.

As a federated state, two key points must be highlighted. First, Quebec’s IPS is primarily rooted in commercial interests, as it does not have the authority to develop its own foreign defence policy (Lasserre, 2023). Second, as a province, Quebec is constrained in its capacity to negotiate and implement trade agreements with sovereign states. In this context, Quebec’s sovereign economic policies are buttressed by the agreements forged by the federal government. The Canada-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA), ratified in 2015, was Canada’s first FTA with an Asian country and provides the basis for closer trade and investment relations between South Korea and Quebec (Global Affairs Canada, 2021). Since the CKFTA’s inception, Quebec and South Korea have steadily built a synergistic economic partnership in industrial production and advanced manufacturing. For instance, in 2023, the government implemented an Action Plan for the Canada-Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that builds on several agreements (Global Affairs Canada, 2024a), including the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Critical Minerals Supply Chains and the Clean Energy Transition and Energy security to facilitate trade and investment in leading sectors applicable to both Quebec and South Korea, such as electric vehicles (EVs) (Global Affairs Canada, 2023).

This study addresses two critical gaps in the literature by analyzing how provincial strategies aimed at engaging external economies impact public opinion, trade, and FDI. First, there is a notable lack of scholarship on how strategies like the IPS influence public opinion, trade and FDI. Second, while most research on Indo-Pacific strategies centers on national-level approaches and geopolitical or security dynamics, the role of subnational actors—such as provinces, states, or regions—are overlooked in shaping and implementing these strategies. This is especially true in the context of major initiatives such as the CKFTA and both federal and provincial IPS.

In the context of a decade of Canada-South Korea economic partnership, this paper examines economic trends distinct to Quebec and South Korea. More specifically, we trace the evolution of public perception of South Korea at the subnational level in Quebec, with subsequent sections addressing the steady expansion of trade and investment in critical industries. We found that IPS initiatives at the federal and provincial governments improve public opinion and lead to higher trade and FDI. These findings are consistent with existing research showing that positive public opinion tends to coincide with greater economic exchange at the national level (Yingli, 2023; Xiao, 2024). Quebec serves as a particularly compelling case study not only because of its active and relatively autonomous international engagement—reflecting its broader effort to assert political distinctiveness on the global stage—but also due to its distinct perspectives on Asia, which often diverge from those of the rest of Canada (Veilleux, 2025; Zhu & Labrecque, 2018).    

2. Methodology

To assess changes in public perception, we use data from the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s (APFC) National Opinion Poll (NOP), a biannual survey conducted between 2010 and 2024 to measure Canada-wide public perception on Asia-Pacific issues. The survey is conducted every two years, with 2021 replacing 2022 as an exceptional year with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. NOP respondents are Canadian citizens or permanent residents and at least 18 years old. Only data from Quebec residents were used in this paper, with an average of 884 respondents per survey from Quebec. Individual demographic and socio-economic information were collected to ensure a broad representation of respondents, including age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, education level, occupation, and household income.

Our study also draws on quantitative data from Statistics Canada (Stats Canada) to assess merchandise trade flows and the APFC’s Investment Monitor data to assess inbound and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between Quebec and South Korea. We used Quebec’s 2021 IPS as a benchmark to compare the evolution of Quebec-South Korea trade and investment relations three years before Quebec’s announcement of the IPS (2019-2021) and three years after its implementation (2022-2024). In doing so, we assess the changes in public attitudes, trade, and investment, focusing on descriptive methods.

3. Increased Public Trust

Since the launch of the Indo-Pacific Strategies, diplomatic engagement with South Korea has expanded at both the federal and provincial levels. This growing relationship has been further reinforced by the Canada–South Korea Global Strategic Partnership, launched in September 2022. Since then, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly has undertaken four diplomatic visits to South Korea, underscoring the importance of deepening bilateral ties in the Indo-Pacific region (Global Affairs Canada, 2024b). Similarly, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol emphasized the significance of these ties during his first bilateral diplomatic visit to Canada in September 2022. Closer ties between Canada and South Korea were also marked by the launch of the Year of Cultural Exchanges 2024-2025, celebrating the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Canadian Heritage, 2024).

Quebec leads the way in Canadian cultural involvement in South Korea. According to the South Korean news agency AJU Press, nearly two-thirds of all Canadian cultural activities in South Korea stem from Quebec (Kim, 2025). As for the Quebec government, it has upgraded the status of its representation in Seoul to that of a delegation in March 2024, testifying to Quebec’s interest in strengthening diplomatic ties with South Korea. This was followed by the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Quebec and the Seoul Metropolitan Government, establishing a framework to strengthen bilateral collaboration and foster trade (Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie, 2024).

As a result, South Korea has experienced the greatest surge in favourability in Quebec public opinion over the past 15 years. The NOP conducted in 2010 revealed that Quebecers rated their trust in South Korea at only 3.6 out of 10, ranking slightly above Afghanistan (2.9) but below Pakistan and China (5.1), Japan (5.5), and India (7). Confidence in South Korea has steadily increased, overtaking trust in both China and India from 2018 onwards, with South Korea establishing itself as the second most trusted country in Asia after Japan (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Quebecers’ Level of Trust for Selected Asian Countries (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, National Opinion Poll)

In terms of strategic milestones, the 2016 NOP result marks the first survey since the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA) came into force, of which 53% of Quebecers were in favour of the agreement, compared with 18% who were opposed and 29% who were neutral. This reflects the result of a steady rise in Quebecers’ level of confidence in South Korea since 2010, from 3.60 to 5.86 over six years. The second key reference point is in 2021, when trust in all Asian countries declined, likely reflecting broader trends of global instability during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although trust in South Korea experienced a slight dip in 2021 to a low of 4.48—it surged back to 5.59 in 2024, three years after the launch of its IPS.

Growing confidence toward South Korea is also unfolding within a broader geopolitical context marked by increased engagement with Asia and a strategic diversification away from the U.S. Reflecting this shift, APFC’s 2024 NOP found that 69% of Quebec respondents acknowledged that increased investment from Asia would benefit Canada, marking the highest approval in the last decade. At the same time, we observe that despite growing interest in Asia more broadly, Quebecers’ perception of China has declined significantly since 2019, largely driven by Beijing’s       2018 arbitrary detention of two Canadians: Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. Despite China’s position as Canada’s top Asian trading partner on a national level, it remains the Asian country least trusted by Quebecers. The 2024 NOP revealed that 90% of Quebecers supported Canada’s efforts to diversify trade away from China and towards other prominent trading partners in Asia. Reflecting these strained relations, two major provincial investment bodies—Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and Investissement Québec (Robillard, 2023)—announced the closure of their offices in China, citing geopolitical instability. As such, high-profile strategic decisions implemented on a provincial level demonstrate the real impact of trust from a subnational actor on external economies, such as those of South Korea and China.          

Notably, although Quebecers’ trust in South Korea is lower than their trust in traditional allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, the relative trust in South Korea compared to these traditional partners has increased rapidly. While confidence in these traditional allies has remained relatively stable since 2010, trust in South Korea has nearly doubled. This shift became especially pronounced during Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021), when Quebecers’ trust in South Korea surpassed their confidence in the United States and remained higher throughout his presidency, until the beginning of Joe Biden’s term. Considering the aggressive protectionist tariff regime pursued under Donald Trump’s second presidency in 2025, we project a further decline in confidence in the United States, increasing Quebec’s national sentiment to diversify Canada’s partnerships in favour of Asian allies.

Research has shown that favourable public opinion in a host country can significantly boost FDI (Yingli, 2023; Xiao, 2024). The growing relationship between Quebec and South Korea—strengthened by supportive policies under Quebec’s IPS —has not only improved public sentiment but also coincided with increased trade and inward FDI, as Quebecers and Canadian companies increasingly view South Korea as a reliable economic partner.

4. From Quebec’s Mines to Korea’s Factories: Quebec-South Korea Merchandise Trade

The Quebec-South Korea merchandise trade has been growing steadily over the last decade since the CKFTA and has continued to strengthen following the implementation of the IPS, bolstered by a shared drive towards economic resilience through advanced manufacturing and innovation (Figure 2). The national CKFTA placed South Korea on Canada’s economic radar, covering a broad range of target industries as key beneficiaries of this agreement, including the manufacturing and industrial sectors (Global Affairs Canada, 2025). This would pave the way for Quebec’s IPS, which highlighted particular segments within the CKFTA’s parent industries tailored to the province’s economic profile.

The effectiveness of the IPS is evident when examining the trade value from three years before (2019-2021) and three years after (2022-2024) the strategy’s launch, with exports ramping up by around C$462M (16%) and imports expanding by C$637M (27%). Indeed, both the CKFTA and Quebec’s IPS officially recognized South Korea as a lucrative and first-rate trade partner, bolstering public trust and resulting in ramp-ups of trade activity after the implementation of each initiative.

Figure 2. Comparing Quebec-South Korea Merchandise Tradeafter the CKFTA and Quebec IPS, 2010-2024 (Statistics Canada, Table 12-10-0173-01)

4.1. Quebec’s Top Export to Korea: Iron Ore

Quebec’s top export to South Korea is concentrated in its leading primary industry: metals and minerals. Incentivized by the IPS, businesses in extractives and corresponding advanced manufacturing sectors have demonstrated increased trade activity; for example, iron ore exports from Quebec to South Korea have increased the most, comprising 58% of average export values post-IPS, and achieving even greater consolidation compared to the previous average of 49% from 2019 to 2021 (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Quebec’s Top Exports with South Korea: Comparing pre- and post-IPS (Statistics Canada, Trade Data Online, 2019-2024)

Quebec has been the leading exporter of iron ore and concentrates across Canada for the past decade, with an average of 12% of all shipments destined for South Korea. This takes on even more significance in the context of the international critical mineral supply chain; in 2024, the Canadian federal government and Quebec government revised their 2021 Critical Minerals list to include high-purity iron that can produce low-emission or “green” steel, reinforcing Quebec’s role in the global energy transition (Natural Resources Canada, 2024). Indeed, the province’s four active iron mines exploit the Labrador Trough, containing one of the purest iron ores in the world (Natural Resources Canada, 2025; Normand, 2024). Thus, Quebec’s resources establish the subnational actor’s essential role in the global arena and grant even greater corresponding power behind its decision to export to its IPS-directed key markets, especially for iron ore.

Considering that steel, and thus iron ore, is a fundamental building block of industrial power, sustained exports of Quebec’s critical mineral to South Korea underscore a deepening political and economic partnership between the two regions, one that continues to grow stronger over time. South Korea’s industrial reforms decreed in the 2020 Korean New Deal to achieve a “green economy” alongside strengthened global environmental regulations (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020; Lee 2024) it is unsurprising that the country’s imports of Quebec’s iron ore jumped by 59% or around C$243M in the year following its release (from C$410M in 2020 to C$654M in 2021) and has continued to grow. This shift is further illustrated by POSCO’s 2022 strategy for green steel expansion, which signals lasting industry transformations due to its position as the leading domestic steelmaking company that was foundational to the nation’s post-Korean War economic rebuilding and structuring (POSCO Group, 2022; 2013). As South Korea’s fourth-largest supplier of iron ore, Canada offers a geopolitically stable and reliable alternative to more volatile sources in the industry, while South Korea is a key partner enabling Canada’s declaration to diversify its steel export markets beyond its top market in the U.S. (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025; Previl, 2025).

4.2. Quebec’s Top Imports from South Korea: Complementary Goods

All of Quebec’s top imports from South Korea are intermediate or finished goods that directly support its ambitions within the energy transition, namely in the electric vehicle (EV) value chain. Illustratively, the largest imports from South Korea post-IPS adoption were electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies for electronic components within smart devices and industrial machinery, while the next largest import segment was lead-acid and lithium-ion electric accumulators, or rechargeable batteries.

Figure 4. Quebec’s Top Imports with South Korea: Comparing pre- and post-IPS (Statistics Canada, Trade Data Online, 2019-2024)

South Korean microchips play a key role in filling the gaps in Quebec’s integrated circuit industry, which lacks production capacity. Quebec’s integrated circuit imports from South Korea rose by around C$163M, from around C$222M three years before the IPS to C$385M three years post-strategy release (Figure 4). While being home to Technum Quebec, the province’s innovation zone, Polytechnique Montreal’s semiconductor research centre, and government investment into a pre-university microelectronics research centre (Government of Quebec, 2022), Quebec’s industries remain concentrated in research and development and continue to import semiconductors from South Korea. This import pattern mirrors the trust accorded between the two trading partners with respect to Quebec’s iron ore; indeed, South Korea’s microchips are part and parcel to Quebec’s technological advancement in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Furthermore, electric accumulators are key components of the EV supply chain, into which both the Quebec and South Korean governments have invested heavily (Choo & Chen, 2025; Shingler, 2023). In Quebec’s case, the IPS specifically states its intention to create an entire battery sector value chain, with South Korea, Japan, and China listed as the current leaders dominating global lithium-ion battery manufacturing. Complementary to the IPS, the Transportez vert financial aid program came into force in 2021 to incentivize businesses, municipalities, and organizations to procure low-emission vehicles, particularly large vehicles containing rechargeable electric batteries (Government of Quebec, 2021a). As a result, Quebec had record-breaking sales for battery electric and plug-in EVs, accounting for 43% of all EV sales in Canada (Canada Energy Regulator, 2022). Quebec’s EV manufacturers sought batteries from South Korea in response to this heightened demand, facilitated by the longstanding trust built over time through the CKFTA. Electric accumulator imports accounted for less than C$61M from 2019 to 2021, but more than doubled post-IPS, amounting to around C$130M, from 2022 to 2024. This trend indicates that while Quebec continues to develop its battery value chain, it relies on South Korean incumbents to keep up with its market demands by importing its lead-acid and lithium-ion batteries.

The top trading products shed light on the interconnectedness of these two economies. This bilateral economic partnership is based on complementary trade, primarily characterized by Quebec supplying the raw material and purchasing intermediate or finished goods from South Korea. As shown in the data, both key import and export sectors have experienced significant growth since the implementation of Quebec’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

5. Beyond the IPS: Addressing One-Sided FDI Flows

After the launch of Quebec’s IPS, foreign direct investment (FDI) between Quebec and South Korea has increased substantially, led by South Korea’s investment into Quebec. The IPS along with Quebec’s plans to promote the EV industry, have supported an increase in FDI, particularly along the EV value chain in Quebec. Comparing inward FDI flows between Quebec and South Korea in the three years before the strategy’s launch (2019-2021) with the three years after (2022-2024), we observe a doubling in FDI from South Korea (an increase of around C$1313M), with inbound investment peaking at around C$1.7B in 2023, and ceasing in 2024 (Figure 5). Although the data indicate a decline in FDI flows in 2024, that may be a result of rebalancing in the face of large investments with a multi-year implementation timeline completed in 2023.

Figure 5: Quebec-South Korea FDI Flows, 2019-2024. (Investment Monitor, fDi Markets, 2025)

South Korean companies were welcomed into Quebec’s critical mineral extraction (with FDI growing over C$1B), software (with FDI inflows at C$364M), and automobile industries (with FDI flows reaching C$273M), many of which are linked to the province’s centrality in EV battery production and demand. South Korea’s Solus Advanced Materials, operating as Volta Energy Solutions Canada, was the single largest investor in Quebec’s industrial metals and mining, committing over C$1B in a plant to produce copper foil for EV batteries in Granby. Investment in the software sector was led by Krafton, a South Korean games developer, which opened a new studio in Montreal. Automobiles and parts investment came in the form of two investments to build cathode manufacturing facilities – one by POSCO Future M and General Motors in Bécancour and the other with SK On and EcoPro BM.

The battery production projects offer tangible economic benefits for Quebecers – leading to positive public perception and openness to more FDI from South Korea. These projects are projected to create over 550 new jobs in the province, with French-speaking employees benefitting from these hiring opportunities (Quebec Delegation in Seoul, 2024; Jeong & Lee, 2024; Harrison et al., 2023).  These initiatives closely align with Quebec’s Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Act, as the province leads the Canadian market in both ZEV adoption and charging infrastructure development (Statistics Canada, 2025). To build stronger investment relations in areas such as energy transition, Quebec has increased its trade missions to Seoul (Veillette, 2024). Notably, the Quebec office in Seoul was elevated to the status of a full delegation in 2024, underscoring the growing importance of bilateral relations. As such, Quebec was primed to capitalize on partnerships and FDI borne from South Korea’s growing EV industry ahead of other Canadian provinces.

In contrast to growing FDI from South Korea to Quebec, Quebec’s FDI flows into South Korea have been negligible, illustrating limited engagement from Quebec’s companies in the peninsula that has not changed after the IPS launch. The only outbound FDI deal completed since the provincial IPS was launched was a greenfield investment by Laval-based Synergx Technologies to open a South Korean office in 2021. During this period, there was another major deal announced by Loop Industries, a Terrebonne-based clean-technology company, to construct the Infinite Loop PET plant in Ulsan, South Korea. The deal was however cancelled at the beginning of 2025 due to operating cost considerations (Access Newswire, 2025). Relatively lower FDI levels can be explained by the inward focus of Quebec’s IPS on FDI – seeking to attract inward FDI.

Overall, Quebec’s IPS has led to an increase in investment from South Korean battery production companies, yet it has failed to increase Quebec’s investment in the region. Unlike in the case of trade, where imports and exports have increased simultaneously, investment has been one-sided, driven by investment from South Korea to Quebec. Our analysis of FDI from Quebec to South Korea after the IPS has found that, while South Korea presents an important market for corporate diversification, it is also a high-cost jurisdiction for investors, making it more expensive for investors to operate. Thus, resulting in lower outward FDI. Nonetheless, we anticipate closer collaboration between Quebec and South Korea in the future, given the evolving geopolitical landscape and Canada’s strategic interest in reducing its reliance on the U.S.

6. Quebec–South Korea Collaboration in a Shifting Global Order

The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by Sino-American rivalry and the decoupling of Canada’s two largest trading partners, underscores the urgent need for Canada to diversify its economic partnerships. With U.S. tariffs disrupting several Quebec industries, including the EV battery sector, Premier Legault has emphasized the need to diversify provincial markets and economic partnerships, particularly in Asia (Lecavalier, 2025). Within this context, South Korea has emerged as an increasingly significant partner in both diplomatic and commercial realms for Quebec and for Canada. The Quebec-South Korea relationship since the IPS has not only strengthened but has also demonstrated remarkable dynamism and resilience. This growing partnership is evident in the increased confidence Quebecers have in South Korea, interlinkages of EV value chains, as well as the importance placed on trade missions and diplomatic engagements between the two nations.

Our research finds that a federated state’s para-diplomacy has an important impact on public perception, trade and FDI. Although Quebec’s economic policies are bolstered by the agreements forged by the federal government, such as the CKFTA, the Quebec government has been proactive in implementing its foreign policy, as evidenced by its IPS and its growing commercial relations with South Korea. This aligns with research highlighting the growing significance of subnational diplomacy in international relations, emphasizing the complementary role provinces can play alongside federal foreign policy to achieve shared objectives—such as reducing reliance on the United States and strengthening ties with Asian countries (Fraser, 2024; Paquin, 2019). Bilateral trade and FDI inflows have grown significantly since the implementation of Quebec’s IPS. Trade has been bolstered by the CKFTA, which lowered tariffs for Canadian and South Korean companies shipping products across the border and was further boosted by the IPS that encouraged specific sectors, such as critical minerals and high-end manufacturing as our paper has demonstrated. South Korea also boosted FDI into Quebec, following the implementation of the IPS and policies welcoming FDI in EVs. However, the data indicate that FDI inflows into South Korea have remained negligible during this period, underscoring the persistent barriers faced by Quebec-based companies seeking to invest in the country.

These findings underscore the importance of an Indo-Pacific strategy for federated states, like Quebec. Provincial interests often compete with one another, particularly in efforts to attract foreign investment to their own territories. In terms of FDI inflows, Quebec’s strategic focus on the EV sector has positioned it to benefit from major South Korean investments. These investments are especially critical in today’s geopolitical climate, given the decline in American investment in this sector under the second Trump administration (Veilleux & Ufimtseva, 2025). With the return of Trump to the U.S. presidency, introducing renewed unpredictability in American foreign policy, middle powers such as Canada and South Korea are increasingly seeking to strengthen their bilateral coordination (Simpson & Hwang, 2025). This includes exploring multilateral frameworks and trade agreements designed to reduce dependence on the United States and to mitigate the impact of protectionist measures. Economic exchanges between Quebec and South Korea should also be expanded, especially given the rising positive public perception of South Korea among Quebecers.

While Quebec’s IPS is primarily commercially driven (Lasserre, 2023), thus leading to an increase in FDI and trade, the article also shows a growing sense of trust among Quebecers toward South Korea—fueled by expanding diplomatic and cultural initiatives between the two regions. This trend is particularly significant, as Kim & Österberg (2025) demonstrate that individuals who perceive high levels of Korean FDI, or reside in areas where such investments are more visible, tend to hold more favourable views toward foreign investment. However, APFC polls reveal a persistent lack of awareness regarding South Korea’s importance to Canada’s prosperity. As Canada’s seventh-largest trading partner (Global Affairs Canada, 2024c), South Korea plays a significant role in the economy. Nevertheless, only 37% of Quebec respondents in APFC’s 2024 NOP recognized South Korea as vital to Canada’s economic well-being, with 38% dismissing the country’s importance. This sentiment is echoed in the lack of outbound FDI from Quebec to South Korea, demonstrating a persistent lack of engagement from Quebec businesses. In fact, South Korea ranked below countries such as India and Australia—nations with comparatively less trade significance to Canada—highlighting the pressing need to enhance visibility to shape public perceptions and unlock the full potential of this bilateral relationship.

Conclusion

At this critical juncture marked by global trade tensions and uncertainty, Canada and Quebec have an unprecedented opportunity to establish themselves as trusted trade and investment partners and as champions of rules-based and open trade. Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy plays a pivotal role in this effort by expanding and diversifying trade ties with anchor markets, such as South Korea, reinforcing years of mutual trust and economic collaboration.

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