From Strategy to Synergy: Assessing the Impact of Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy on Public Trust, Trade and Investment with South Korea

18 décembre 202522 décembre 2025Laisser un commentaire

Regards géopolitiques 11(4), 2025

Anastasia Ufimtseva, Alexandre Veilleux and Kana Minju Bak

Dr. Anastasia Ufimtseva is a Senior Program Manager of the International Trade and Investment research pillar at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, an Adjunct Professor at the Beedie School of Business, and a faculty fellow at the Jack Austin Centre for Asia Pacific Business Studies. She holds a PhD in Global Governance from the Balsillie School of International Affairs at Wilfrid Laurier University with a specialization in international political economy.

Dr. Alexandre Veilleux is a Senior Program Manager at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada for Quebec, and Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. He specializes in issues of international political economy and Southeast Asian politics.

Kana Minju Bak is an International Trade and Investment Researcher at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. She holds an MSc in International Business and Sustainability from Sciences Po Paris (Institut d’études politiques de Paris) and an HBA in Contemporary Asian Studies and Diaspora and Transnational Studies from the University of Toronto.

Abstract
Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) identified South Korea as an anchor market for trade diversification in December 2021, nearly a year before Canada’s national IPS. Current scholarship remains limited on how sub-national actors, such as provinces, shape and influence spheres of public opinion and flows of international trade and investment. We aim to address this gap by examining how Quebec’s public opinion of South Korea, along with bilateral trade and investment relations, have evolved since the launch of its IPS. Leveraging original data from the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada – Investment Monitor database and National Opinion Poll – in addition to Statistics Canada, we find that inward foreign direct investment and trade have grown steadily since the launch of Quebec’s IPS in December 2021, with critical minerals and EVs especially benefitting from growing economic relations bolstered by increasing trust among Quebecers about South Korea.

Keywords: trade, investment, federalism, public opinion, Quebec, South Korea, Indo-Pacific Strategy

Résumé
La Stratégie indo-pacifique du Québec (SIP) a identifié la Corée du Sud comme un marché d’ancrage pour la diversification commerciale en décembre 2021, près d’un an avant la SIP nationale du Canada. Les recherches actuelles restent limitées sur la manière dont les acteurs infranationaux, tels que les provinces, façonnent et influencent l’opinion publique ainsi que les flux commerciaux et investissements internationaux. Nous adressons ce manque en examinant comment l’opinion publique québécoise à l’égard de la Corée du Sud, ainsi que les relations bilatérales en matière de commerce et d’investissement, ont évolué depuis le lancement de l’IPS. En nous appuyant sur des données originales provenant de la base de données Investment Monitor et du sondage d’opinion national de la Fondation Asie Pacifique du Canada, ainsi que de Statistique Canada, nous constatons que les investissements directs étrangers et le commerce ont augmenté de façon constante depuis le lancement de la Stratégie d’investissement du Québec en décembre 2021, les minéraux critiques et les véhicules électriques bénéficiant particulièrement de l’intensification des relations économiques, favorisée par la confiance croissante des Québécois envers la Corée du Sud.

Mots-clés : commerce, investissement, fédéralisme, opinion publique, Québec, Corée du Sud, Stratégie Indo-Pacifique

1. A Decade of Growth: the Quebec-South Korea Economic Partnership

Since 1965, Quebec has consistently demonstrated its sovereignty in para-diplomacy and economic structuring since the inception of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. Case in point, Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) was launched in December 2021, nearly a year prior to the federal IPS in November 2022. The Indo-Pacific region was identified as a priority under the theme, “Pathway to Economic Growth,” with South Korea positioned as an anchor market for trade diversification and as one of the world’s leading international investors essential to achieving Quebec’s ambitions. By doing so, Quebec became the first subnational government in the world to formally articulate an Indo-Pacific Strategy.

As a federated state, two key points must be highlighted. First, Quebec’s IPS is primarily rooted in commercial interests, as it does not have the authority to develop its own foreign defence policy (Lasserre, 2023). Second, as a province, Quebec is constrained in its capacity to negotiate and implement trade agreements with sovereign states. In this context, Quebec’s sovereign economic policies are buttressed by the agreements forged by the federal government. The Canada-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA), ratified in 2015, was Canada’s first FTA with an Asian country and provides the basis for closer trade and investment relations between South Korea and Quebec (Global Affairs Canada, 2021). Since the CKFTA’s inception, Quebec and South Korea have steadily built a synergistic economic partnership in industrial production and advanced manufacturing. For instance, in 2023, the government implemented an Action Plan for the Canada-Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that builds on several agreements (Global Affairs Canada, 2024a), including the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Critical Minerals Supply Chains and the Clean Energy Transition and Energy security to facilitate trade and investment in leading sectors applicable to both Quebec and South Korea, such as electric vehicles (EVs) (Global Affairs Canada, 2023).

This study addresses two critical gaps in the literature by analyzing how provincial strategies aimed at engaging external economies impact public opinion, trade, and FDI. First, there is a notable lack of scholarship on how strategies like the IPS influence public opinion, trade and FDI. Second, while most research on Indo-Pacific strategies centers on national-level approaches and geopolitical or security dynamics, the role of subnational actors—such as provinces, states, or regions—are overlooked in shaping and implementing these strategies. This is especially true in the context of major initiatives such as the CKFTA and both federal and provincial IPS.

In the context of a decade of Canada-South Korea economic partnership, this paper examines economic trends distinct to Quebec and South Korea. More specifically, we trace the evolution of public perception of South Korea at the subnational level in Quebec, with subsequent sections addressing the steady expansion of trade and investment in critical industries. We found that IPS initiatives at the federal and provincial governments improve public opinion and lead to higher trade and FDI. These findings are consistent with existing research showing that positive public opinion tends to coincide with greater economic exchange at the national level (Yingli, 2023; Xiao, 2024). Quebec serves as a particularly compelling case study not only because of its active and relatively autonomous international engagement—reflecting its broader effort to assert political distinctiveness on the global stage—but also due to its distinct perspectives on Asia, which often diverge from those of the rest of Canada (Veilleux, 2025; Zhu & Labrecque, 2018).

2. Methodology

To assess changes in public perception, we use data from the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s (APFC) National Opinion Poll (NOP), a biannual survey conducted between 2010 and 2024 to measure Canada-wide public perception on Asia-Pacific issues. The survey is conducted every two years, with 2021 replacing 2022 as an exceptional year with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. NOP respondents are Canadian citizens or permanent residents and at least 18 years old. Only data from Quebec residents were used in this paper, with an average of 884 respondents per survey from Quebec. Individual demographic and socio-economic information were collected to ensure a broad representation of respondents, including age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, education level, occupation, and household income.

Our study also draws on quantitative data from Statistics Canada (Stats Canada) to assess merchandise trade flows and the APFC’s Investment Monitor data to assess inbound and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between Quebec and South Korea. We used Quebec’s 2021 IPS as a benchmark to compare the evolution of Quebec-South Korea trade and investment relations three years before Quebec’s announcement of the IPS (2019-2021) and three years after its implementation (2022-2024). In doing so, we assess the changes in public attitudes, trade, and investment, focusing on descriptive methods.

3. Increased Public Trust

Since the launch of the Indo-Pacific Strategies, diplomatic engagement with South Korea has expanded at both the federal and provincial levels. This growing relationship has been further reinforced by the Canada–South Korea Global Strategic Partnership, launched in September 2022. Since then, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly has undertaken four diplomatic visits to South Korea, underscoring the importance of deepening bilateral ties in the Indo-Pacific region (Global Affairs Canada, 2024b). Similarly, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol emphasized the significance of these ties during his first bilateral diplomatic visit to Canada in September 2022. Closer ties between Canada and South Korea were also marked by the launch of the Year of Cultural Exchanges 2024-2025, celebrating the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Canadian Heritage, 2024).

Quebec leads the way in Canadian cultural involvement in South Korea. According to the South Korean news agency AJU Press, nearly two-thirds of all Canadian cultural activities in South Korea stem from Quebec (Kim, 2025). As for the Quebec government, it has upgraded the status of its representation in Seoul to that of a delegation in March 2024, testifying to Quebec’s interest in strengthening diplomatic ties with South Korea. This was followed by the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Quebec and the Seoul Metropolitan Government, establishing a framework to strengthen bilateral collaboration and foster trade (Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie, 2024).

As a result, South Korea has experienced the greatest surge in favourability in Quebec public opinion over the past 15 years. The NOP conducted in 2010 revealed that Quebecers rated their trust in South Korea at only 3.6 out of 10, ranking slightly above Afghanistan (2.9) but below Pakistan and China (5.1), Japan (5.5), and India (7). Confidence in South Korea has steadily increased, overtaking trust in both China and India from 2018 onwards, with South Korea establishing itself as the second most trusted country in Asia after Japan (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Quebecers’ Level of Trust for Selected Asian Countries (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, National Opinion Poll)

In terms of strategic milestones, the 2016 NOP result marks the first survey since the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA) came into force, of which 53% of Quebecers were in favour of the agreement, compared with 18% who were opposed and 29% who were neutral. This reflects the result of a steady rise in Quebecers’ level of confidence in South Korea since 2010, from 3.60 to 5.86 over six years. The second key reference point is in 2021, when trust in all Asian countries declined, likely reflecting broader trends of global instability during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although trust in South Korea experienced a slight dip in 2021 to a low of 4.48—it surged back to 5.59 in 2024, three years after the launch of its IPS.

Growing confidence toward South Korea is also unfolding within a broader geopolitical context marked by increased engagement with Asia and a strategic diversification away from the U.S. Reflecting this shift, APFC’s 2024 NOP found that 69% of Quebec respondents acknowledged that increased investment from Asia would benefit Canada, marking the highest approval in the last decade. At the same time, we observe that despite growing interest in Asia more broadly, Quebecers’ perception of China has declined significantly since 2019, largely driven by Beijing’s 2018 arbitrary detention of two Canadians: Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. Despite China’s position as Canada’s top Asian trading partner on a national level, it remains the Asian country least trusted by Quebecers. The 2024 NOP revealed that 90% of Quebecers supported Canada’s efforts to diversify trade away from China and towards other prominent trading partners in Asia. Reflecting these strained relations, two major provincial investment bodies—Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and Investissement Québec (Robillard, 2023)—announced the closure of their offices in China, citing geopolitical instability. As such, high-profile strategic decisions implemented on a provincial level demonstrate the real impact of trust from a subnational actor on external economies, such as those of South Korea and China.

Notably, although Quebecers’ trust in South Korea is lower than their trust in traditional allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, the relative trust in South Korea compared to these traditional partners has increased rapidly. While confidence in these traditional allies has remained relatively stable since 2010, trust in South Korea has nearly doubled. This shift became especially pronounced during Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021), when Quebecers’ trust in South Korea surpassed their confidence in the United States and remained higher throughout his presidency, until the beginning of Joe Biden’s term. Considering the aggressive protectionist tariff regime pursued under Donald Trump’s second presidency in 2025, we project a further decline in confidence in the United States, increasing Quebec’s national sentiment to diversify Canada’s partnerships in favour of Asian allies.

Research has shown that favourable public opinion in a host country can significantly boost FDI (Yingli, 2023; Xiao, 2024). The growing relationship between Quebec and South Korea—strengthened by supportive policies under Quebec’s IPS —has not only improved public sentiment but also coincided with increased trade and inward FDI, as Quebecers and Canadian companies increasingly view South Korea as a reliable economic partner.

4. From Quebec’s Mines to Korea’s Factories: Quebec-South Korea Merchandise Trade

The Quebec-South Korea merchandise trade has been growing steadily over the last decade since the CKFTA and has continued to strengthen following the implementation of the IPS, bolstered by a shared drive towards economic resilience through advanced manufacturing and innovation (Figure 2). The national CKFTA placed South Korea on Canada’s economic radar, covering a broad range of target industries as key beneficiaries of this agreement, including the manufacturing and industrial sectors (Global Affairs Canada, 2025). This would pave the way for Quebec’s IPS, which highlighted particular segments within the CKFTA’s parent industries tailored to the province’s economic profile.

The effectiveness of the IPS is evident when examining the trade value from three years before (2019-2021) and three years after (2022-2024) the strategy’s launch, with exports ramping up by around C$462M (16%) and imports expanding by C$637M (27%). Indeed, both the CKFTA and Quebec’s IPS officially recognized South Korea as a lucrative and first-rate trade partner, bolstering public trust and resulting in ramp-ups of trade activity after the implementation of each initiative.

Figure 2. Comparing Quebec-South Korea Merchandise Tradeafter the CKFTA and Quebec IPS, 2010-2024 (Statistics Canada, Table 12-10-0173-01)

4.1. Quebec’s Top Export to Korea: Iron Ore

Quebec’s top export to South Korea is concentrated in its leading primary industry: metals and minerals. Incentivized by the IPS, businesses in extractives and corresponding advanced manufacturing sectors have demonstrated increased trade activity; for example, iron ore exports from Quebec to South Korea have increased the most, comprising 58% of average export values post-IPS, and achieving even greater consolidation compared to the previous average of 49% from 2019 to 2021 (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Quebec’s Top Exports with South Korea: Comparing pre- and post-IPS (Statistics Canada, Trade Data Online, 2019-2024)

Quebec has been the leading exporter of iron ore and concentrates across Canada for the past decade, with an average of 12% of all shipments destined for South Korea. This takes on even more significance in the context of the international critical mineral supply chain; in 2024, the Canadian federal government and Quebec government revised their 2021 Critical Minerals list to include high-purity iron that can produce low-emission or “green” steel, reinforcing Quebec’s role in the global energy transition (Natural Resources Canada, 2024). Indeed, the province’s four active iron mines exploit the Labrador Trough, containing one of the purest iron ores in the world (Natural Resources Canada, 2025; Normand, 2024). Thus, Quebec’s resources establish the subnational actor’s essential role in the global arena and grant even greater corresponding power behind its decision to export to its IPS-directed key markets, especially for iron ore.

Considering that steel, and thus iron ore, is a fundamental building block of industrial power, sustained exports of Quebec’s critical mineral to South Korea underscore a deepening political and economic partnership between the two regions, one that continues to grow stronger over time. South Korea’s industrial reforms decreed in the 2020 Korean New Deal to achieve a “green economy” alongside strengthened global environmental regulations (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020; Lee 2024) it is unsurprising that the country’s imports of Quebec’s iron ore jumped by 59% or around C$243M in the year following its release (from C$410M in 2020 to C$654M in 2021) and has continued to grow. This shift is further illustrated by POSCO’s 2022 strategy for green steel expansion, which signals lasting industry transformations due to its position as the leading domestic steelmaking company that was foundational to the nation’s post-Korean War economic rebuilding and structuring (POSCO Group, 2022; 2013). As South Korea’s fourth-largest supplier of iron ore, Canada offers a geopolitically stable and reliable alternative to more volatile sources in the industry, while South Korea is a key partner enabling Canada’s declaration to diversify its steel export markets beyond its top market in the U.S. (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2025; Previl, 2025).

4.2. Quebec’s Top Imports from South Korea: Complementary Goods

All of Quebec’s top imports from South Korea are intermediate or finished goods that directly support its ambitions within the energy transition, namely in the electric vehicle (EV) value chain. Illustratively, the largest imports from South Korea post-IPS adoption were electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies for electronic components within smart devices and industrial machinery, while the next largest import segment was lead-acid and lithium-ion electric accumulators, or rechargeable batteries.

Figure 4. Quebec’s Top Imports with South Korea: Comparing pre- and post-IPS (Statistics Canada, Trade Data Online, 2019-2024)

South Korean microchips play a key role in filling the gaps in Quebec’s integrated circuit industry, which lacks production capacity. Quebec’s integrated circuit imports from South Korea rose by around C$163M, from around C$222M three years before the IPS to C$385M three years post-strategy release (Figure 4). While being home to Technum Quebec, the province’s innovation zone, Polytechnique Montreal’s semiconductor research centre, and government investment into a pre-university microelectronics research centre (Government of Quebec, 2022), Quebec’s industries remain concentrated in research and development and continue to import semiconductors from South Korea. This import pattern mirrors the trust accorded between the two trading partners with respect to Quebec’s iron ore; indeed, South Korea’s microchips are part and parcel to Quebec’s technological advancement in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Furthermore, electric accumulators are key components of the EV supply chain, into which both the Quebec and South Korean governments have invested heavily (Choo & Chen, 2025; Shingler, 2023). In Quebec’s case, the IPS specifically states its intention to create an entire battery sector value chain, with South Korea, Japan, and China listed as the current leaders dominating global lithium-ion battery manufacturing. Complementary to the IPS, the Transportez vert financial aid program came into force in 2021 to incentivize businesses, municipalities, and organizations to procure low-emission vehicles, particularly large vehicles containing rechargeable electric batteries (Government of Quebec, 2021a). As a result, Quebec had record-breaking sales for battery electric and plug-in EVs, accounting for 43% of all EV sales in Canada (Canada Energy Regulator, 2022). Quebec’s EV manufacturers sought batteries from South Korea in response to this heightened demand, facilitated by the longstanding trust built over time through the CKFTA. Electric accumulator imports accounted for less than C$61M from 2019 to 2021, but more than doubled post-IPS, amounting to around C$130M, from 2022 to 2024. This trend indicates that while Quebec continues to develop its battery value chain, it relies on South Korean incumbents to keep up with its market demands by importing its lead-acid and lithium-ion batteries.

The top trading products shed light on the interconnectedness of these two economies. This bilateral economic partnership is based on complementary trade, primarily characterized by Quebec supplying the raw material and purchasing intermediate or finished goods from South Korea. As shown in the data, both key import and export sectors have experienced significant growth since the implementation of Quebec’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

5. Beyond the IPS: Addressing One-Sided FDI Flows

After the launch of Quebec’s IPS, foreign direct investment (FDI) between Quebec and South Korea has increased substantially, led by South Korea’s investment into Quebec. The IPS along with Quebec’s plans to promote the EV industry, have supported an increase in FDI, particularly along the EV value chain in Quebec. Comparing inward FDI flows between Quebec and South Korea in the three years before the strategy’s launch (2019-2021) with the three years after (2022-2024), we observe a doubling in FDI from South Korea (an increase of around C$1313M), with inbound investment peaking at around C$1.7B in 2023, and ceasing in 2024 (Figure 5). Although the data indicate a decline in FDI flows in 2024, that may be a result of rebalancing in the face of large investments with a multi-year implementation timeline completed in 2023.

Figure 5: Quebec-South Korea FDI Flows, 2019-2024. (Investment Monitor, fDi Markets, 2025)

South Korean companies were welcomed into Quebec’s critical mineral extraction (with FDI growing over C$1B), software (with FDI inflows at C$364M), and automobile industries (with FDI flows reaching C$273M), many of which are linked to the province’s centrality in EV battery production and demand. South Korea’s Solus Advanced Materials, operating as Volta Energy Solutions Canada, was the single largest investor in Quebec’s industrial metals and mining, committing over C$1B in a plant to produce copper foil for EV batteries in Granby. Investment in the software sector was led by Krafton, a South Korean games developer, which opened a new studio in Montreal. Automobiles and parts investment came in the form of two investments to build cathode manufacturing facilities – one by POSCO Future M and General Motors in Bécancour and the other with SK On and EcoPro BM.

The battery production projects offer tangible economic benefits for Quebecers – leading to positive public perception and openness to more FDI from South Korea. These projects are projected to create over 550 new jobs in the province, with French-speaking employees benefitting from these hiring opportunities (Quebec Delegation in Seoul, 2024; Jeong & Lee, 2024; Harrison et al., 2023). These initiatives closely align with Quebec’s Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Act, as the province leads the Canadian market in both ZEV adoption and charging infrastructure development (Statistics Canada, 2025). To build stronger investment relations in areas such as energy transition, Quebec has increased its trade missions to Seoul (Veillette, 2024). Notably, the Quebec office in Seoul was elevated to the status of a full delegation in 2024, underscoring the growing importance of bilateral relations. As such, Quebec was primed to capitalize on partnerships and FDI borne from South Korea’s growing EV industry ahead of other Canadian provinces.

In contrast to growing FDI from South Korea to Quebec, Quebec’s FDI flows into South Korea have been negligible, illustrating limited engagement from Quebec’s companies in the peninsula that has not changed after the IPS launch. The only outbound FDI deal completed since the provincial IPS was launched was a greenfield investment by Laval-based Synergx Technologies to open a South Korean office in 2021. During this period, there was another major deal announced by Loop Industries, a Terrebonne-based clean-technology company, to construct the Infinite Loop PET plant in Ulsan, South Korea. The deal was however cancelled at the beginning of 2025 due to operating cost considerations (Access Newswire, 2025). Relatively lower FDI levels can be explained by the inward focus of Quebec’s IPS on FDI – seeking to attract inward FDI.

Overall, Quebec’s IPS has led to an increase in investment from South Korean battery production companies, yet it has failed to increase Quebec’s investment in the region. Unlike in the case of trade, where imports and exports have increased simultaneously, investment has been one-sided, driven by investment from South Korea to Quebec. Our analysis of FDI from Quebec to South Korea after the IPS has found that, while South Korea presents an important market for corporate diversification, it is also a high-cost jurisdiction for investors, making it more expensive for investors to operate. Thus, resulting in lower outward FDI. Nonetheless, we anticipate closer collaboration between Quebec and South Korea in the future, given the evolving geopolitical landscape and Canada’s strategic interest in reducing its reliance on the U.S.

6. Quebec–South Korea Collaboration in a Shifting Global Order

The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by Sino-American rivalry and the decoupling of Canada’s two largest trading partners, underscores the urgent need for Canada to diversify its economic partnerships. With U.S. tariffs disrupting several Quebec industries, including the EV battery sector, Premier Legault has emphasized the need to diversify provincial markets and economic partnerships, particularly in Asia (Lecavalier, 2025). Within this context, South Korea has emerged as an increasingly significant partner in both diplomatic and commercial realms for Quebec and for Canada. The Quebec-South Korea relationship since the IPS has not only strengthened but has also demonstrated remarkable dynamism and resilience. This growing partnership is evident in the increased confidence Quebecers have in South Korea, interlinkages of EV value chains, as well as the importance placed on trade missions and diplomatic engagements between the two nations.

Our research finds that a federated state’s para-diplomacy has an important impact on public perception, trade and FDI. Although Quebec’s economic policies are bolstered by the agreements forged by the federal government, such as the CKFTA, the Quebec government has been proactive in implementing its foreign policy, as evidenced by its IPS and its growing commercial relations with South Korea. This aligns with research highlighting the growing significance of subnational diplomacy in international relations, emphasizing the complementary role provinces can play alongside federal foreign policy to achieve shared objectives—such as reducing reliance on the United States and strengthening ties with Asian countries (Fraser, 2024; Paquin, 2019). Bilateral trade and FDI inflows have grown significantly since the implementation of Quebec’s IPS. Trade has been bolstered by the CKFTA, which lowered tariffs for Canadian and South Korean companies shipping products across the border and was further boosted by the IPS that encouraged specific sectors, such as critical minerals and high-end manufacturing as our paper has demonstrated. South Korea also boosted FDI into Quebec, following the implementation of the IPS and policies welcoming FDI in EVs. However, the data indicate that FDI inflows into South Korea have remained negligible during this period, underscoring the persistent barriers faced by Quebec-based companies seeking to invest in the country.

These findings underscore the importance of an Indo-Pacific strategy for federated states, like Quebec. Provincial interests often compete with one another, particularly in efforts to attract foreign investment to their own territories. In terms of FDI inflows, Quebec’s strategic focus on the EV sector has positioned it to benefit from major South Korean investments. These investments are especially critical in today’s geopolitical climate, given the decline in American investment in this sector under the second Trump administration (Veilleux & Ufimtseva, 2025). With the return of Trump to the U.S. presidency, introducing renewed unpredictability in American foreign policy, middle powers such as Canada and South Korea are increasingly seeking to strengthen their bilateral coordination (Simpson & Hwang, 2025). This includes exploring multilateral frameworks and trade agreements designed to reduce dependence on the United States and to mitigate the impact of protectionist measures. Economic exchanges between Quebec and South Korea should also be expanded, especially given the rising positive public perception of South Korea among Quebecers.

While Quebec’s IPS is primarily commercially driven (Lasserre, 2023), thus leading to an increase in FDI and trade, the article also shows a growing sense of trust among Quebecers toward South Korea—fueled by expanding diplomatic and cultural initiatives between the two regions. This trend is particularly significant, as Kim & Österberg (2025) demonstrate that individuals who perceive high levels of Korean FDI, or reside in areas where such investments are more visible, tend to hold more favourable views toward foreign investment. However, APFC polls reveal a persistent lack of awareness regarding South Korea’s importance to Canada’s prosperity. As Canada’s seventh-largest trading partner (Global Affairs Canada, 2024c), South Korea plays a significant role in the economy. Nevertheless, only 37% of Quebec respondents in APFC’s 2024 NOP recognized South Korea as vital to Canada’s economic well-being, with 38% dismissing the country’s importance. This sentiment is echoed in the lack of outbound FDI from Quebec to South Korea, demonstrating a persistent lack of engagement from Quebec businesses. In fact, South Korea ranked below countries such as India and Australia—nations with comparatively less trade significance to Canada—highlighting the pressing need to enhance visibility to shape public perceptions and unlock the full potential of this bilateral relationship.

Conclusion

At this critical juncture marked by global trade tensions and uncertainty, Canada and Quebec have an unprecedented opportunity to establish themselves as trusted trade and investment partners and as champions of rules-based and open trade. Quebec’s Indo-Pacific Strategy plays a pivotal role in this effort by expanding and diversifying trade ties with anchor markets, such as South Korea, reinforcing years of mutual trust and economic collaboration.

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The US « Indo-Pacific Strategy »: Concept, Action and Evaluation

22 avril 202524 avril 2025Laisser un commentaire

Regards géopolitiques v11n1, 2025

Dr. Gong Ting

Dr. Gong Ting is Deputy Director & Associate Research Fellow at the Department for International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing.

Abstract: The deepening of United States focus on “Indo-Pacific region” in recent years symbolizes a major shift in US global strategy, which is entering a new cycle focused on « great power competition ». The Trump Administration 1.0 created the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » and promoted it from concept to action, and the Biden administration has further strengthened the strategy. The evolution of the strategy has several implications on the Asia-Pacific region, including intensifying the forming of blocs and regional instability, bringing anti-globalization factors to Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation, etc. The U.S. has also prioritized “American First” in its relation with its allies and partners in the region.

The Asia-Pacific region is culturally diverse, economically vibrant and has great potential for development. Pursuing peace, development and cooperation remains the common pursuit and aspiration of the people in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region need to learn from the experience of the past three decades, adhere to maintaining regional security, stability and prosperity, oppose the new Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, resist anti-globalization and decoupling, and jointly promote the construction of a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, open and inclusive Asia-Pacific community.

Key Words: United States, « Indo-Pacific Strategy », Asia-Pacific, Analysis

Résumé : L’accent mis par les États-Unis sur la « région indo-pacifique » ces dernières années incarne un changement majeur dans la stratégie mondiale des États-Unis, qui entre dans un nouveau cycle axé sur la « concurrence entre grandes puissances ». L’administration Trump 1.0 a créé la « stratégie indo-pacifique » et l’a fait passer du concept à l’action, et l’administration Biden l’a encore renforcée. L’évolution de la stratégie a plusieurs conséquences sur la région Asie-Pacifique, notamment l’intensification de la formation de blocs et de l’instabilité régionale, l’introduction de facteurs anti-mondialisation dans la coopération économique régionale en Asie-Pacifique, etc. Les États-Unis ont également donné la priorité à l’« American First » dans leurs relations avec leurs alliés et partenaires dans la région.

La région Asie-Pacifique est culturellement diverse, économiquement dynamique et possède un grand potentiel de développement. La recherche de la paix, du développement et de la coopération reste la quête et l’aspiration communes des peuples de la région Asie-Pacifique. Les pays de la région Asie-Pacifique doivent tirer les leçons de l’expérience des trois dernières décennies, adhérer au maintien de la sécurité, de la stabilité et de la prospérité régionales, s’opposer à la nouvelle mentalité de la guerre froide et à la confrontation des blocs, résister à l’antimondialisation et au découplage, et promouvoir conjointement la construction d’une communauté Asie-Pacifique plus pacifique, plus sûre, plus prospère, plus ouverte et plus inclusive.

Mots-clés : États-Unis ; Stratégie Indo-Pacifique ; Asie-Pacifique ; analyse.

In recent years, the United States has fabricated the concept of « Indo-Pacific » and vigorously promoted the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». It symbolizes another major shift in US global strategy, which is entering a new cycle focused on « great power competition ». The shift of the primary goal of US global strategy from « responding to terrorism » to « great power competition » has already sprouted since the Obama administration, marked by global strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region and proposals of the « Pivot to Asia » and « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific » strategies. During the first term, the Trump Administration created the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » and promoted the strategy from concept to action. The Biden administration has further strengthened this strategy, making it more dimensional and systematic.

The US « Indo-Pacific Strategy« : From Concept to Action

1.1. Obama administration: Action preparation and conceptual planning for the « Indo-Pacific Strategy »

From « Back to Asia » to « Pivot to Asia », and then to « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific », US Asia-Pacific strategy that ran through eight years during the Obama administrations did not mention the word « Indo-Pacific ». However, the Obama administration pushed to shift of US global strategic focus from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region, which has had a sustained impact on the later versions of « Indo-Pacific strategies » of the Trump and Biden administrations.

In terms of strategic goals, the US aimed to build a regional strategic environment that aligned with its own interests. As put forward by Mr. Antony Blinken, the then Deputy Secretary of State of the Obama Administration, this effort is « to rebalance our focus on the region and to strengthen a rules-based, institutions-based order that is advancing our interests and increasingly not only in the region but globally »[①](US Department of State, 2016). As the weight of the Asia-Pacific region continued to rise in the world’s political and economic landscape, the US attached greater importance to the region, with the view to maintain its interests and « leadership » position. US goals included building an order that is in line with US political interests and strengthening its alliance networks and partnerships, ensuring a « free and open » economic and trade system, strengthening US deterrence in security and promoting « US-style democracy and human rights ». At the same time, although the Obama administration still positioned China as a « partner », its perception of China as a « competitor » further intensified.

Therefore, the US focused on consolidating its regional alliance and partnership system, including deepening relations with its traditional treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia), strengthening trilateral relationships such as the US-Japan-South Korea, US-Japan-India, and US-Japan-Australia, and bringing closer partnerships with countries such as India, Indonesia. The US significantly expanded its military cooperation with regional allies and strengthened military deployment in the « First Island Chain » and « Second Island Chain ». To make up for shortcomings in its regional economic investment, the US also made efforts to « rule making » of regional economic architecture, through participating in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations since the year of 2009 and promoting its expansion. As a traditional foreign policy tool of US democrats, “Values-based diplomacy » had also been given significant color.

While the « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific » strategy was facilitated, the word « Indo-Pacific » had been increasingly evident in US official discourses. In October 2010, the then US Secretary of State Clinton delivered a speech titled « America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific », emphasizing that « we understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade and commerce » (Clinton, H., 2010). Subsequently, Clinton and several senior US officials repeatedly raised the word of « Indo-Pacific » in several official occasions. However, during this period, the word « Indo-Pacific » emerged more as a geographical or geopolitical concept, and did not directly enter into US policy discourse.

1.2. Trump administration: formal proposal, basic formation and implementation of the « Indo-Pacific strategy »

After Trump took office as US president in January 2017, the Obama Administration’s “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific » strategy came to an end. In March 2017, the then Acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton said that the « the new administration has its own plan for the region, even if that plan has yet to take shape” (Defense News, 2017).

In October 2017, Trump officially proposed the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » during his attendance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Leaders’ Summit in Vietnam. With the US government significantly increasing its focus on the « Indo-Pacific region », its worldview has undergone a major adjustment since the end of the Cold War. In December 2017, the National Security Strategy Report (The White House, 2017) released by the Trump administration emphasized that the era of « great power competition » has arrived. The report defined the top three challenges facing US global strategy as « China and Russia », » North Korea and Iran » and « transnational terrorist organizations ». Next, the Trump administration continued this tone in multiple official documents. The « Indo-Pacific strategy » was gradually introduced in this context.

Trump himself and his cabinet members extensively mentioned a « free and open Indo-Pacific ». In the eyes of the United States, the “Indo-Pacific region” contains 61% of the world’s population, and the US has 7 of its 15 largest trading partners located in this region. The US also has 5 treaty alliances in this region (US Department of Defense, nd). In the 2017 National Security Strategy Report, the US replaced « Asia-Pacific » with « Indo-Pacific » for the first time and officially proposed the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». Several US government departments then issued action documents centered on the « Indo-Pacific Strategy », outlining specific policies from the perspectives of defense, diplomacy and economy (US Department of Defense, 2019; US Department of State, nd).

In January 2021, the Trump administration declassified the 2018 version of the « US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific Strategy », which was drafted in 2018 and originally scheduled to be declassified on December 31, 2042. Such move reflected that the Trump administration launched top-level design around the « Indo-Pacific strategy » in the early stages after its inauguration, outlining US national security challenges, vital interests, top interests, specific actions and objectives, etc, in the context of “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. The Trump administration declassified this document before stepping down office, revealing a strong sense of building « Indo-Pacific Strategy » legacy.

In 2018, the US officially renamed the « Pacific Command » to the « Indo-Pacific Command » (the unified combatant command of the United States Armed Forces responsible for the “Indo-Pacific region”). The Trump administration gradually pushed the « Indo-Pacific Strategy » from concept to action. The Trump administration has generally followed the direction of strengthening US alliance and partnership system, but pays more emphasis on « America First ». However, in making the concept of « Indo-Pacific » more visible and increasing strategic attention to the region, the US and its regional allies have shown strong convergence.

In military perspective, the US aimed to establish a networked alliances and partnership that is “capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains” (US Department of Defense, 2019). While increasing the overall military spending, the US significantly increased joint exercises with its allies to enhance « readiness ». The Trump administration also continuously expanded security assistance to strengthen its influence on Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Pacific Island countries. The US military has also strengthened its military activities in the Western Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. According to the « South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative », from 2018 to 2020, the scale and intensity of US military activities in the South China Sea have significantly increased, including various strategic platform activities, sea and air reconnaissance, « Freedom of Navigation Operations », « transit through the Taiwan Strait », military exercises, etc (South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, nd).

Although Trump announced withdrawal from TPP at the beginning of his presidency, the US government has not completely stopped economic investment in the « Indo-Pacific region », and emphasized the need to make up for shortcomings in economic investment. In July 2018, the US announced a $113 million « down payment » to support the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure sectors in the region, with the aim of driving larger scale private investment. In October, the US introduced the « Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act »(BUILD Act). The act advocated for merging the existing Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to establish the United States International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC), attempting to innovate overseas investment and financing methods. During this period, the US established multiple partnerships with its allies and partner countries in areas such as energy, infrastructure, digital economy and cybersecurity.

1.3. Biden administration: Deepening and Upgrading the « Indo-Pacific strategy »

As the US political tradition says, « Politics stops at the water’s edge » (United States Senate, nd). Generally speaking, the continuity of the two parties in global strategy and diplomacy is greater than their variability. The Biden administration, which took office in January 2021, directly « followed » the name of « Indo-Pacific Strategy » created by the previous Republican administration without renaming it, and accelerated the deepening and upgrading of the strategy.

The Biden administration further highlighted the primacy of « responding to China » in US global strategy, particularly regarding the empowerment of its alliance and partnership system as a core means to « multiply power » and revitalizing global leadership. In the view of the Biden administration, the crucial position of the « Indo-Pacific region » and the « Indo-Pacific strategy » is even more prominent. The « Interim National Security Strategic Guidance « released in March 2021 emphasized that US « vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere » (The White House, 2021). The Biden administration also established a « Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs », which was the first time the White House National Security Council created a related position after « Indo-Pacific ».

In February 2022, the White House officially released the 19-page « Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States » (The White House, 2022), which identified five dimensions of « free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient » as the strategic objectives, and proposed action plans and timelines for the strategy. The US also released two « Fact Sheet(s) » for the strategy in February 2023 and February 2024, attempting to demonstrate a « fast pace » in advancing the strategy to reaffirm its « commitment » to the region.

In political and diplomatic context, compared to Trump 1.0, the Biden administration placed greater emphasis on conducting summit diplomacy and further « repairing » its alliance and partnership system. The US and relevant countries frequently expressed their views on « maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region » or promoting security, stability, and prosperity in the « Indo-Pacific region », emphasizing the need to deepen bilateral alliance treaties or partnerships. The US also sought to upgrade alliance or partnership with Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, attempting to achieve new breakthroughs in its relations with ASEAN and Pacific Island countries. The US also aimed to promoted stronger coordination among its allies and partners. Since the « reboot » during the Trump era, the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) has become a key increment for the US to deepen its « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». During the Biden administration, the QUAD dialogue has been upgraded to head-of-state level and held regularly, and added multiple areas of cooperation. The US also accelerated « NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific » and « NATO-ization of the Asia-Pacific region », frequently making statements with its NATO allies around the « Indo-Pacific region ». The allies of the US in the « Indo-Pacific region » showed an increasingly strong trend of

In security and military context, the US strengthened top-level design around « great power competition » and introduced the « Integrated Deterrence Strategy ». This reflected the Biden administration’s national defense strategy of starting from « position of strength » and “reinvigorated alliance power » in order to strengthen deterrence and competitive advantages. The US significantly raised its defense spending in the “Indo-Pacific Region”, especially increased its budget for the “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” year by year. The US promoted the establishment of AUKUS (The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.), with the goal of jointly supporting Australia in acquiring conventional nuclear powered submarines and sharing information, technology and intelligence among the three countries. Since 2024, AUKUS has continuously released expansion signals.

Compared to Trump 1.0, the Biden administration placed greater emphasis on strengthening the economic pillar of “Indo-Pacific strategy ». In May 2022, the US announced the launch of “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework”, an economic initiative put forward by former U.S. President Joe Biden, known as IPEF, which included 13 founding member countries (Fiji later joined as the 14th founding member), attempting to build a regional economic cooperation framework around four major areas: trade, supply chain resilience, clean energy transition and fair economy. The Biden administration outlined « economic security » and « supply chain cooperation », and built « supply chain alliances » with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and other countries around areas such as semiconductors and critical minerals. Meanwhile, sectors such as cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, clean energy, climate change and public health also became key concerns of the Biden administration.

Compared to Trump 1.0, the Biden administration’s « Value-based Diplomacy » actions in the “Indo-Pacific region” were more visible. The US government has significantly expanded its diplomatic resources in the region around issues such as democracy and human rights, anti-corruption, open society, independent media, civil society, etc.

Evaluation of US “Indo-Pacific Strategy”

2.1. Intensifying the forming of blocs and regional instability

Building security and military alliances was a product of Cold War history and bloc confrontation. In the post Cold War era, the US still holds a Cold War and zero-sum mindset. Whether it is the « Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific Strategy » or the « Indo-Pacific Strategy », the US has always prioritized strengthening its alliance system, enhancing the construction of the trilateral or quadrilateral blocs, and promoting a more networked regional alliance and partner system. Such moves had brought negative effects to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.

US military expenditure has been the highest in the world for decades, usually exceeding the total military expenditure of the following nine countries. In 2023, the US military expenditure was $916 billion, accounting for 37% of the total global military expenditure (SIPRI, 2024). As of 2022, there were around 750 US military bases in at least 80 countries and about 170,000 troops stationed outside of the US and its territories (Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2024).

The “Indo-Pacific Command” is the largest geographically covered of the six major combat commands of US military, with a force of over 370000 personnel, more than 1000 aircraft and over 100 warships (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, nd). During the Trump administration, according to incomplete statistics, the US conducted over 90 military exercises with its allies in the “Indo-Pacific region” each year (杨晓萍，2021). The Biden administration has further increased military spending in the “Indo-Pacific region”, with a significant increase in funding for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in the 2021-2024 fiscal years. The federal government’s budget proposal for the 2025 fiscal year has increased Pacific Deterrence Initiative budget request to $9.9 billion. The special funding for the “Indo-Pacific Command” under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 was as high as $15.3 billion, higher than for other theater commands.

With the continuity and long-term nature of US global strategic focus on the « Indo-Pacific Region », the US has been promoting significant strengthening of its Trans-Atlantic alliance system and the « Indo-Pacific » regional alliance system, especially accelerating the « NATO’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific » and « NATO-ization of the Asia-Pacific region », which has brought more unstable and uncertain factors to regional security situation. Since 2022, NATO summits have invited leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand three times, and listed the four countries as « global partners ». While conducting summits and high-level interactions, NATO’s military and security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, especially Japan and South Korea, has been upgraded from traditional defense cooperation such as personnel and ship visits to cooperation forms such as intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and joint research and development of weapons and equipment. Such actions not only increased the risk of bloc confrontation, but may also stimulate escalation of regional arms races and trigger more conflicts. As several scholars pointed out in an article published in Foreign Affairs in July 2024, « Rather than bolstering regional security, the alliance (NATO)’s growing engagement with Asia could fuel insecurity and instability (Droin, M., Grieco, K. & Jacob, H., 2024). The Jakarta Post, an Indonesian newspaper, published an editorial board review after Japan’s new Prime Minister Ishiba took office in 2024, stating that « ASEAN will not buy into Ishiba’s idea about an Asian NATO. As a group, ASEAN needs Japan as a reliable trading and economic partner, not a military ally that would only exacerbate tensions in the region » (The Jakarta Post, 2024).

In early 2023, AUKUS announced the road map and timetable for the US and UK to provide nuclear submarines to Australia. The three countries pieced together a “trilateral security partnership”, promoted cooperation in nuclear submarines and other cutting-edge military technologies, which stimulated arms race, challenged the international nuclear non-proliferation system, incited bloc politics and military confrontation, and undermined regional peace and stability. Former Sri Lankan President Wickremesinghe pointed out during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2023 that AUKUS was « a mistake » and that most countries in the region « will not want NATO anywhere close by » (South China Morning Post, 2023). Former Australian Prime Minister Keating criticized AUKUS as the « worst deal in all history » and « AUKUS is really about, in American terms, the military control of Australia » (The Guardian, 2023).

2.2. Empowering Regional Partners or “America First”?

The start of Trump 1.0 in 2017 was the result of deepening right-wing and conservative politics in the US. Therefore, Trump’s domestic and foreign policies were aimed at « America First » and adopted populist, nativist, unilateralism and protectionist approaches. The Trump administration not only ignored international mechanisms and global governance, withdrew from several international organizations and treaties, but also tends to use a « transactional » mindset to handle foreign affairs. The Trump administration was unwilling to invest in alliance relationships, which greatly weakened the credibility of US diplomacy.

The Trump administration also largely adhered to the principle of « America First » in dealing with its relationships with allies in the Asia Pacific region. It demanded that allies should share more obligations in security and imposed tariffs on allies. Such trends were reflected in US relations with Japan, South Korea, and other countries. The Trump administration has also frequently used economic and trade tools against US emerging partners, such as India and Vietnam. As the then president, Trump often made confrontational remarks against partner countries, withdrew from the TPP on his first day in office and repeatedly missed important multilateral occasions in the region, including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting and the East Asia Summit. As experts from the Brookings Institutions have pointed out, « the broader trend line for U.S. alliances and partnerships has been far more negative under the Trump administration” (Ford, L., 2020).

As a partner that the US is striving to bring closer, ASEAN has not responded positively to Trump administration’s « Indo-Pacific strategy ». Trump did not attach importance to ASEAN, not only missed the East Asia Summit for three consecutive years, but also missed the US-ASEAN Summit in its last year in office. Compared to attending the East Asia Summit five times during the Obama administration and making Southeast Asia a key partner for « Rebalancing » within the region, the Trump administration’s « Indo-Pacific Strategy » has significantly reduced its strategic emphasis on Southeast Asia. In the document of ASEAN Outlook on the « Indo-Pacific » (Center for International Law, 2019) released in 2019, ASEAN particularly emphasized the need to maintain « ASEAN-Centred Regional Architecture » and strengthen its discourse power. At the same time, the document also highlighted principles such as mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit, which were significantly different from the Trump administration’s version of the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ».

Different from the Trump administration, the Biden administration’s diplomacy emphasizes on boosting the alliance and partnership system and strengthening investment in allies and partners, with the “Indo-Pacific region” as a key focus. It can be said that Trump is the initiator of the slogan « America First », and both parties are promoters of America First policy. Compared to Trump’s unilateralism policy, the Democratic Party version of « America First » seems relatively « friendly » to U.S. allies and partners. However, this is not the case. Although the Biden administration emphasized on cooperation with allies and partners, it still adhered to protectionism and the policy of « buying American and hiring American », in order to cater for anti-globalization and economic nativism trends domestically. This resulted in limited benefits that US could provide for its allies in the so-called « friend-shoring ». a growing trade and industrial practice where supply chain networks are focused on countries regarded as political and economic allies (Ellerbeck, S., 2023). The US has also implemented many measures that harm the interests of its allies. For example, U.S. government required South Korean semiconductor enterprises such as Samsung to submit trade secrets. It imposed discriminatory measures against industries such as automobiles, batteries, and renewable energy from Japan, South Korea and Europe in subsidy policy from the Inflation Reduction Act.

2.3. Bringing anti-globalization factors to Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation

As Columbia University Professor Jeffry Frieden pointed out, « The United States is by far the most important locus of this backlash against globalization » (Frieden, J., 2018). As the biggest beneficiary and most active promoter of economic globalization, the US has played a more negative role in economic globalization and the global free trade system in recent years. Its unilateralism and protectionism trends have greatly increased, and mindsets for pan-securitization and « great power competition » continue to intensify. The fundamental reason lies in the fact that the US regards economic globalization as a « scapegoat » for the widening wealth gap and the failure of domestic wealth distribution mechanism domestically, and regards economic and trade issues as a « tool » for « great power competition ». The Trump administration prefers to impose tariffs, while the Biden administration is more inclined to resort to industrial and supply chain policies, both of which use export controls, investment restrictions, and economic sanctions more frequently. In all, the protectionist color of US trade and investment policies continues to intensify, with supply chain policies shifting towards localization, near-shoring and “friend-shoring”, industrial policies becoming more prevailing, and immigration policies becoming more conservative. This has led to a significant increase in international community’s concerns about « anti-globalization » and even « economic warfare ».

In the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific region has been the most dynamic and promising economic pillar in the world, and is widely recognized as an important engine of global economic growth. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have always adhered to open regionalism, continuously strengthened multilateral economic cooperation, and made important contributions to maintaining the multilateral trading system and promoting an open world economy. After withdrawing from the TPP, one of the high standard free trade agreements in the region, the US still talked about the need to make up for economic shortcomings of the « Indo-Pacific Strategy ». It also launched the « Indo-Pacific Economic Framework » aimed at reshaping regional economic cooperation framework, but it did not substantially address key issues of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, market access, and other common concerns among regional countries. As pointed out by Mary Lovely of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, « the IPEF has not been crafted as a traditional trade agreement. In particular, it does not offer signatories preferential access to the U.S. market. That might make the IPEF more acceptable in the United States, but it will hamper the effectiveness of the pact” (Lovely, 2023).The reason behind is that with the rise of populism in the US, opposition against free trade has become largely “politically correct”. In such domestic political atmosphere, it is difficult for both Republican and Democratic governments to substantively continue promoting free trade agreement negotiations, let alone promoting open and inclusive regional cooperation and economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although seven ASEAN countries have joined the IPEF negotiations, their views on the effectiveness of IPEF are declining due to the lack of a substantial trade pillar and the increasing negative impact of domestic politics, especially election factors, on IPEF in the US. According to the State of Southeast Asia Survey Report 2024 conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, positive sentiments about the IPEF of Southeast Asian respondents declined from 46.5% in 2023 to 40.4% in 2024, while 44.8% of Southeast Asians respondents are increasingly unsure about the impact and effectiveness of the IPEF, rising from a 41.8% share from 2023. Negative sentiments have also increased from 11.7% in 2023 to 14.9% in 2024 (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024).

Conclusion. What kind of future vision does the Asia-Pacific region really need?

The “Indo-Pacific” concept twists the concept of Asia-Pacific that is the basic architecture of the region. Since the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region has become the center of world economic growth and a highland for global development, stability and cooperation. The key is that this region has surpassed the outdated thinking of zero-sum games and bloc confrontation, followed the trend of peace and development and is committed to maintaining regional security and stability, as well as deepening regional economic cooperation.

Faced with increasingly unstable, uncertain and unpredictable factors in world situation, the Asia-Pacific region is facing multiple new challenges. The Asia-Pacific region is culturally diverse, economically vibrant and has great potential for development. Pursuing peace, development and cooperation remains the common pursuit and aspiration of the people in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region need to learn from the experience of the past three decades, adhere to maintaining regional security, stability and prosperity, oppose the new Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, resist anti-globalization and decoupling, and jointly promote the construction of a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, open and inclusive Asia-Pacific community.

References

Center for International Law (2019). 2019 ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, June 23, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019-ASEANs-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific.pdf

Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2024). “ The US is sending more troops to the Middle East. Where in the world are US military deployed?”, April 5, https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/us-sending-more-troops-middle-east-where-world-are-us-military-deployed

Clinton, H. (2010). “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” October, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150141.htm.

Defense News (2017). “Pivot to the Pacific’ is over, senior U.S. diplomat says” , March 14, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/14/pivot-to-the-pacific-is-over-senior-u-s-diplomat-says/.

Droin, M., Grieco, K. & Jacob, H. (2024). “Why NATO Should Stay Out of Asia-The Alliance Would Leave the Region Less, Not More, Secure”, Foreign Affairs, July 8, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/why-nato-should-stay-out-asia

Ellerbeck, S.(2023). “What’s the difference between ‘friendshoring’ and other global trade buzzwords?”, World Econmic Forum, Feb., https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/02/friendshoring-global-trade-buzzwords/

Ford, L. (2020). “ The Trump administration and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, May, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fp_20200505_free_open_indo_pacific.pdf

Frieden, J. (2018). “The backlash against globalization and the future of the international economic order”, February, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jfrieden/files/frieden_future_feb2018.pdf

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (2024). “ The State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report”, March, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-State-of-SEA-2024.pdf

Lovely, M. (2023). “The Trouble With Trans-Pacific Trade”, Foreign Affairs, January 23, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trouble-trans-pacific-trade

SIPRI (2024). “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023”, April, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf

South China Morning Post (2023). “ On sidelines of UN General Assembly, Sri Lankan president calls Aukus ‘a mistake’ and rejects fears over China”, Sept. 19, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/sidelines-un-general-assembly-sri-093000067.html

South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (nd). http://www.scspi.org/zh.

The Guardian (2023). “ Paul Keating labels Aukus submarine pact ‘worst deal in all history’ in attack on Albanese government”, March 15, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/mar/15/paul-keating-labels-aukus-submarine-pact-worst-deal-in-all-history-in-attack-on-albanese-government.

The Guardian (2024). “ Aukus pact will turn Australia into ‘51st state’ of the US, Paul Keating says”, August 8, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/article/2024/aug/08/aukus-pact-will-turn-australia-into-51st-state-of-the-us-says-paul-keating

The Jakarta Post (2024). “No to Asia’s NATO”, October 5, https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2024/10/05/no-to-asias-nato.html

The White House (2017). “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, December, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

The White House (2021). “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”, March, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/#:~:text=This%20interim%20guidance%20has%20been,on%20a%20National%20Security%20Strategy.

The White House (2022). “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, February, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (nd). “ Headquarters, United States Indo-Pacific Command”, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/

United States Senate (nd). “Arthur Vandenberg: A Featured Biography”, https://www.senate.gov/senators/FeaturedBios/Featured_Bio_Vandenberg.htm

US Department of Defense (2019), “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region”, May 31, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1863396/dod-releases-indo-pacific-strategy-report/.

US Department of Defense (nd). “DoD Focus on the Indo-Pacific”, https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/focus-on-indo-pacific/#:~:text=The%20Defense%20Department%20is%20committed,international%20rules%2C%20laws%20and%20norms .

US Department of State (2016), “Obama Administration Policy in the Asia-Pacific”，April 28, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256694.htm

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杨晓萍 [Yang Xiaoping]（2021）：《特朗普时期美国印太战略回顾》，载《军事文摘 [A Review of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Under Trump, » in Military Digest], juillet.

Charting New Waters: the Canada-Taiwan Relationship under the Scheme of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

20 décembre 202420 décembre 2024Laisser un commentaire

RG, vol10 n3, 2024

Chih-shian LIOU

Professeure, College of International Affairs
National Chengchi University, Taipei
cliou@nccu.edu.tw

Résumé: En décembre 2023, le Canada et Taïwan ont signé l’Accord sur la promotion et la protection des investissements étrangers (APIE), marquant un changement important dans leurs relations bilatérales et offrant de nouvelles possibilités de collaboration économique. Cet accord, qui s’inscrit dans le contexte de l’adhésion du Canada à la politique d’une seule Chine, représente un réalignement stratégique dans la région indo-pacifique. L’accord soutient également la candidature de Taïwan à l’accord global et progressif pour le partenariat transpacifique (CPTPP), bien que les intérêts concurrents de la Chine compliquent cette candidature. En outre, les récents changements politiques à Taïwan et les paysages politiques intérieurs plus larges de divers pays de la région indo-pacifique rendent encore plus complexe la mise en œuvre des stratégies géopolitiques, car ces dynamiques internes influencent considérablement la politique étrangère et l’engagement régional de chaque pays.

Mots-clés : relations Canada-Taiwan, Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), Stratégie Indo-Pacifique, Accord global et progressif pour le partenariat transpacifique.

Summary: In December 2023, Canada and Taiwan signed the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), marking a significant shift in their bilateral relations and offering new opportunities for economic collaboration. This agreement, set against the backdrop of Canada’s adherence to the One China Policy, represents a strategic realignment within the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement also supports Taiwan’s bid for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), though China’s competing interests complicate this bid. Additionally, recent political changes in Taiwan and various Indo-Pacific countries’ broader domestic political landscapes add further complexity to implementing geopolitical strategies, as these internal dynamics significantly influence each country’s foreign policy and regional engagement.

Keywords: Canada-Taiwan relations, Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), Indo-Pacific Strategy, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Introduction

In December 2023, Canada and Taiwan reached a significant bilateral relationship milestone by signing the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA). This landmark agreement underscores a notable shift in the dynamics between Canada and Taiwan, offering a new avenue for collaboration and cooperation in the realm of investment and economic ties. However, amidst the backdrop of the enduring One China Policy (OCP) shaping Canada’s official diplomatic stance, the implications of this agreement extend far beyond mere economic considerations. The FIPA between Canada and Taiwan signifies more than just a bilateral economic partnership. It represents a strategic recalibration of their relationship amidst evolving global dynamics, particularly within the Indo-Pacific region. How it evolves in the near future depends on how both governments navigate geopolitical landscapes and their domestic public opinions.

The bilateral FIPA marks the first agreement resulting from the Canadian government’s updated model of the Investment Canada Act (ICA) in 2021 (Executive Yuan, Republic of China 2023). Concurrently, with the newly established Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Montreal in the same year, the fourth official office of its kind after three decades, Canada’s de facto recognition of Taiwan occurred despite the prevailing OCP (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 2023). This significant development holds promising implications for Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, particularly in bolstering supply chains and fostering strategic coherence. By formalizing economic ties with Taiwan, Canada not only strengthens its position within the Indo-Pacific region but also contributes to broader efforts to enhance economic integration and stability.

Furthermore, this milestone paves the way for Taiwan’s potential accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). As Canada and Taiwan deepen their economic partnership through the bilateral FIPA, Taiwan’s participation in the CPTPP gains momentum, offering mutual benefits and reinforcing the region’s commitment to free trade and multilateralism (Hopewell 2023). Nevertheless, while the bilateral FIPA serves as a significant stepping stone toward Taiwan’s accession to CPTPP, it is imperative to consider the complexities arising from the rival bids for CPTPP membership between China and Taiwan, especially under the framework of the One-China Policy.[1]

The competing claims to CPTPP membership present a tangible challenge for the Canadian government as it assumes the chairmanship of the CPTPP in 2024. With Canada assuming the leadership role within the CPTPP, Taiwan anticipated increased opportunities to advance its bid for membership and enhance its economic integration with other member states. However, as the first couple of months of Canada’s chairmanship progressed, Taiwan encountered setbacks in its application process. The ongoing political tensions between Taiwan and China spilled over into discussions surrounding Taiwan’s CPTPP membership. Some member countries expressed concerns about potential repercussions from China if they openly endorsed Taiwan’s bid. Additionally, procedural challenges within the CPTPP framework complicated Taiwan’s path toward membership, which hardly passes the organization’s consensus-based decision-making process for the same reason.

However, this development should not come as a surprise. Taiwan’s bid for membership in the CPTPP is not solely an economic issue; it is deeply entwined with political considerations (He and Magcamit 2024). Merely pointing out that China’s socialist economic system and its mercantilist practices fall short of the high standards set by the CPTPP while Taiwan meets these standards is not sufficient to address the complexities of the situation. Balancing the interests of both Taiwan and China within the CPTPP framework requires a delicate diplomatic approach that acknowledges Taiwan’s economic significance while respecting the political sensitivities surrounding the One-China Policy. In other words, as Canada charts its course through this intricate geopolitical landscape, it must strive for practical solutions that uphold the tenets of free trade and multilateralism while acknowledging the geopolitical realities.

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s domestic political landscape adds another layer of complexity to this dynamic. Following eight years of governance by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the 2024 presidential election witnessed a significant shift in electoral dynamics. DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te secured victory with only 40.05% of the votes, marking the lowest percentage for a winning candidate since 2004. Furthermore, the DPP lost control of Taiwan’s legislative body, signaling a clear decline in its electoral support. This electoral setback serves as a wake-up call for the DPP, prompting reflection on its approach to cross-strait relations during its tenure.

At the same time, the China-friendly Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party, KMT) emerged as the largest party in the legislature, highlighting a resurgence of support for more conciliatory approaches toward China. The KMT’s emphasis on economic interaction and social exchanges with China resonated with voters, reflecting a growing desire for stability and pragmatism in cross-strait relations. KMT’s Vice Chairman, Mr. Hsia Li-yan, visited China in March, the 8^th time in the past two years. Former President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and had a meeting with Xi Jinping in April. It is essential to note that the economic interdependencies between Taiwan and China play a significant role here. China, including Hong Kong, has historically been the largest destination for Taiwan’s exports despite a gradual decline in the proportion of exports directed toward China.[2] This economic relationship underscores the intricacies of cross-strait relations, where economic cooperation coexists with political tensions (Tsai 2017). In April 2024, 17 KMT legislative members visited China to « break the ice » with China. In return, China partially lifted the ban on its tourists to Taiwan, easing the travel restrictions for Fujian residents to visit Matsu Island, and opened its market access for Taiwan’s agriculture and fishery products. Moreover, recent public opinion polls in Taiwan indicate that over 50% of Taiwanese prefer maintaining the status quo in cross-strait relations, either indefinitely or for now and deciding at a later date.[3] For example, in 2023, the stance of “maintain status quo indefinitely” accounts for 33.2%, while the stance of “maintain status quo, decide at later date” accounts for 27.9%. This sentiment, coupled with the electoral outcomes, challenges the DPP’s previous strategy of comprehensive confrontation with China.

The recent political shifts in Taiwan carry significant implications for the Canada-Taiwan relationship, emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding of Taiwan’s evolving priorities and diplomatic strategies. With Taiwan’s interests delicately balanced between maintaining economic ties and managing political tensions with China (Dittmer 2017), finding common ground between Canada and Taiwan has become more crucial than ever, particularly within the context of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. As the outgoing Tsai Ing-wen administration’s era of comprehensive confrontation with China draws to a close, there is an opportunity for both Canada and Taiwan to reassess their approach to China and explore avenues for constructive engagement that advance shared interests while mitigating potential risks.

Canada’s interests in the region are also influenced by its relationship with China, which has exhibited fluctuating dynamics over time, often characterized by periods of tension and confrontation (Paltiel 2018). Tension between Canada and China has been across various fronts, including trade, diplomacy, human rights, and security. Canada and China maintain robust economic ties, with bilateral trade reaching significant levels. However, tensions have arisen over market access, intellectual property rights, and trade imbalances. Negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement have been ongoing but have faced challenges. Diplomatic relations between Canada and China have been strained, particularly following the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver in December 2018 at the request of the United States. In response, China detained two Canadian citizens, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, on allegations of espionage, widely seen as retaliation. This situation has led to a significant deterioration in diplomatic ties. Canada has raised concerns about human rights abuses in China, particularly regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, crackdowns on democracy in Hong Kong, and repression of political dissent. These issues have strained bilateral relations and led to public criticism from Canadian officials. Canada and China have differing perspectives on various security and geopolitical issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea, cybersecurity concerns, and Canada’s participation in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.

Looking ahead, all these interactions will be heavily debated in Canada’s forthcoming federal election in 2025. Depending on the outcome of the election and subsequent policy decisions, Canada’s interests in the region may be redefined, potentially influencing its approach to China and broader engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, against the backdrop of negative interactions with China and mounting concerns reflected in domestic polls, Canada faces complex considerations in navigating its engagement with Taiwan. The gravity of these considerations underscores the need for careful analysis and strategic decision-making. Moreover, with the impending transition to a new U.S. administration following this year’s election, the geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region is poised for potential shifts, further shaping the strategic calculus for both Canada and Taiwan.

It is evident that the Indo-Pacific Strategy represents a dynamic and evolving framework. As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, so too does the strategy’s content and implementation, reshaped by the diverse domestic contexts of its member countries. Moving forward, the success of the Indo-Pacific Strategy will depend on the continued commitment and collaboration of its member countries, as well as their ability to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics and evolving domestic contexts.

References

Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2023). “Taiwan Opens de facto Consulate in Montreal, Its Fourth in Canada.” https://cast.asiapacific.ca/map/event/4405.

Dittmer, Lowell (2017). “Taiwan and the Waning Dream of Reunification.” In Lowell Dittmer, ed., Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace. California: University of California Press.

Executive Yuan, Republic of China (2023). “Taiwan and Canada Complete Negotiation over a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Arrangement.” https://www.ey.gov.tw/otnen/D3BA0C3D9BF6E894/fee84307-8a2b-45b4-811e-1535de3bc025

He, Tian. and Michael Magcamit (2024). “The CPTPP, Cross-Strait Tensions, and Taiwan’s Recognition for Survival Strategy under the Democratic Progressive Party.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 24 (2): 217-252.

Hopewell, Kristen (2023). “Canada’s CPTPP Leadership in 2024: Managing the Rival Accession Bids of China and Taiwan.” Canadian Global Affairs Institute. https://www.cgai.ca/canadas_cptpp_leadership_in_2024_managing_the_rival_accession_bids_of_china_and_taiwan .

Paltiel, Jeremy (2018). “Facing China: Canada between Fear and Hope.” International Journal 73(3): 343-363.

Tsai, Chung-min (2017). “The Nature and Trend of Taiwanese Investment in China (1991-2014): Business Orientation, Profit Seeking, and Depoliticization.” Dans Lowell Dittmer (dir.), Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace. California: University of California Press.

[1] China formally applied to the CPTPP on September 16, 2021 and Taiwan submitted a request to join the CPTPP a week later on September 22.

[2] For official data on the export destinations of Republic of China, Taiwan, see: https://cuswebo.trade.gov.tw/FSCE3000C?table=FSCE3010F.

[3] According to National Chengchi University Election Study Center which has published the annual survey data on “Changes in the Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese” since 1994, there is an increasing support for cross-strait status quo, including “maintain status quo, decide at later date” and “maintain status quo indefinitely,” in recent years. For the survey data, see: https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963.

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